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WASHINGTON'S NON-INTERVENTION EXECUTORSTARTING POINT FOR PROBATE SIMPLIFICATION
ROBERT L. FLETCHER*
Professor Fletcher's discussion of the history and philosophy of the
non-intervention executorship under the Washington statute is segmented
into four parts. The first three extensively inquire into the philosophy
and forces which have shaped the present contours of this unusual procedure. During this era the court in construing the statutory basis for
the procedure and the legislature in amending it have treated the nonintervention executorship in some respects as part of the regular probate
procedure and in others as wholly separate, quite without unifying
rationale. Further, the court has developed a concept of jurisdictional
immunity of questionable value. In the final section, Some Judgments
and a Proposal,Professor Fletcherargues for a change in the philosophy
underlying the law of non-intervention executorship, to utilize fully its
capacity to handle non-contentious probate in an economical and expeditious manner. He concludes with several concrete proposals, including
a recommendation that, as modified, the non-intervention procedure
become the standard nethod for administering all decedents' estates.

A hundred years ago the Washington territorial legislature provided
a method nearly unique among American jurisdictions' for winding up

the affairs of a decedent. Simplicity itself, the statute required only
that the decedent's will be established in the usual manner, and, if the
will so provided, permitted the estate thereafter to be "managed and
settled without the intervention of the probate court."'
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., Stanford University, 1939,
LL.B., 1947.
1 Texas is the only other American jurisdiction with a well-developed similar procedure. Texas Rev. Civ. Stat., Probate Code §§ 145-54 (1956). For a description of
the Texas procedure see two articles by Professor M. K. Woodward, Independent Administrations Under the New Texas Probate Code, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 687 (1956), and
Some Developments in the Law of Independent Administrations, 37 TEXAs L. Rxv.
828 (1959). A brief comparative treatment stressing Texas law is given in Comment,
Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAs L. R v. 95 (1954).
Although Texas' "independent administration" pre-dates Washington's "non-intervention" proceeding by twenty some years, the origin of Washington's appears to be
completely independent of that of Texas. Both have a common antecedent in the
Roman law's "instituted heir," but search of Washington material contemporaneous
with the adoption of this legislation has shown nothing to suggest that the proponents
knew of the Texas scheme or of the practices in Roman law. Further reference is
made to the civil law background in Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAs L. REv. 95, 97-99 (1954).
Arizona and Idaho also have similar schemes described in statute, but apparently
little or no use is made of them. There are no reported appellate cases dealing with
their statutes, and lawyers in practice in Arizona and Idaho have indicated to the
author that little or no use is made of the statutes. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-502
(1956); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 15-237 (1947).
2 Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1868, at 49.
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Whether from an abundance of confidence or a disdain for detail, the
territorial legislature left it largely to future executors to determine
the precise manner in which they were thus to "manage and settle"
the estates in their care. One implication, however, is clear: the act
was intended to make the winding-up process simpler and less expensive than the regular, formal probate procedure.3 The principal factor
expected to produce simplification and economy was obviously the
nearly complete removal of the proceeding from the court.
In this objective-a simplified, inexpensive system removed from the
court-the statute has largely failed. Costs and complexities in conducting the winding up of decedents' affairs in Washington communities today appear, to the layman at least, to be fairly high.4 The costs
are about the same as in other Pacific Coast states; I the time involved
3 One such indication is in the title of the act and its other major section. The title
is, "An act to reduce the costs and expenses in the administration of estates and to,
provide for the execution of the provisions of wills in certain cases." The other major
section of the act reduced by half the allowable fees for estates of less than one thousand dollars. (At that time the statute prescribed the exact fees. This is not true
today. See note 4 infra).
Nevertheless, the use of the non-intervention executorship has been extensive, for
nearly every lawyer-drawn will provides for it. Litigation and legislation, though not
voluminous, have also been substantial.
4 Washington statutes direct the court to fix a "just and reasonable fee" for both
the personal representative and his attorney. WAsH. REV. CODE § 11A8.210 (1956).
(See notes 137-41 infra for discussion of the extent to which this statute may apply to
non-intervention proceedings.) In addition each bar association around the state has
its own schedule for attorneys' fees, however informal.
The usual practice is for the personal representative and his attorney to be paid
equal amounts. The Seattle-King County Bar Association publishes a Minimurn Fee
Schedule (June 10, 1964) which covers all usual types of legal services including
probate. Although labelled "minimum," the schedule, at least as to probate, is probably more accurately termed "ordinary," for in practice it is followed fairly closely.
It provides, in brief: For the first $1,000, 5%; the next $5,000, 4%; the next $10,000,
3.5%; the next $180,000, 3%; the next $300,000, 2.5%; and all over $500,000, 2%.
The fee is reduced by 25% of that portion which is attributable to the administration
of community property. Under Washington law the entire community estate, not just
the half over which the decedent had dispositive power, is administered. The fee
schedule makes no distinction between estates administered under the regular probate
procedure and those under the non-intervention procedure. It is the author's understanding, however, that some attorneys will occasionally charge less than the minimum
schedule if there is a non-intervention will and a particularly simple estate with fairly
high asset value; no substantiating data is available.
5 California specifies both the personal representative's and the attorney's fee by
statute, as follows: For the first $1,000, 7%; the next $9,000, 4%; the next $40,000,
3%; the next $100,000, 2% ; the next $350,000, 1.5%; and all over $500,000, 1%. Community property receives special treatment: If the decedent was the husband, all community property is included in the fee base; but if the decedent was the wife, and she
disposes of her share to other than her husband, only her share is included in the fee
base. For greater detail, see CALIF. PROD. CODE §§ 901, 910 (1956), and a discussion
in Raddue, Fees and Commissions. Continuing Legal Education of the Bar, California
Estate Administration 959, 964 (1959).
Oregon specifies fees for the personal representative and his attorney by statute, as
follows: For the first $1,000, 7%; the next $9,000, 4%; the next $40,000, 3%; and all
over $50,000, 2%, and "reasonable" attorneys' fees. Oaa. REv. STAT. § 117.680 (1961),
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is about the same; and, despite the "non-intervention" label, the court
today does in fact participate to a very substantial extent in the conduct of a non-intervention proceeding.
Yet the failure has not been complete. Notably in the executor's
dealing with property, as by sale or lease or in operation of a business,
the non-intervention executor has a much simpler time of it than has his
counterpart under the formal probate; also, if he chooses, his final
accounting and distribution can be entirely informal, without the doors
of the courthouse. Other differences to the credit of the non-intervention executor exist, too; they are discussed later.
Not only are there these present advantages; equally important is
the opportunity to look back over a hundred years of experience, to
see why the initial objective was partially thwarted. If the causes of
frustration can be identified and found amenable to treatment or avoidance, a fresh start today could actually accomplish the objective of
that pioneering legislation of the 1860's, in fact to produce a simplified
economical method for winding up the affairs of a decedent.
It is the purpose of this article to make that examination, then to
propose the principal features of a fresh start.
Oregon not having a community property system, the bulk of the assets in the ordinary situation will be subject to probate in the husband's estate, not the wife's. According to 2 J'AUREGUY & LOVE, OREGON PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 648 at 103
(1958), "by custom in many, if not all, counties the attorney's fees allowed, in the
absence of unusual circumstances, is an amount equal to the statutory compensation of
executors and administrators."
Thus for four different assumed estate sizes, in ordinary circumstances, the personal
representative's and attorney's fees in the three respective states would be as set forth
below. This table assumes two different estates for Washington, one entirely the separate property of the decedent husband, and the other entirely community property;
two different estates for California, both entirely community property but one with the
husband the decedent, and the other with the wife the decedent giving half the community property to her children; and one estate for Oregon, entirely the property of
the decedent.
Fees for Personal Representative and His Attorney
Washington (Seattle)
California
Oregon
1) husband
2) wife
1) separate
2) commun.
(community prop.)
a) $30,000 estate
Pers. rep.
$1,100
$ 825
$1,030
$ 580
$1,030
Attorney
$1,100
$ 825
$1,030
$ 580
$1,030
b)
c)
d)

$60,000 estate
Pers. rep.
Attorney
$100,000 estate
Pers. rep.
Attorney
$250,000 estate
Pers. rep.
Attorney

$2,000
$2,000

$1,500
$1,500

$1,830
$1,830

$1,030
$1,030

$1,830
$1,830

$3,200
$3,200

$2,400
$2,400

$2,630
$2,630

$1,630
$1,630

$2,630
$2,630

$7,450
$7,450

$5,587.50
$5,587.50

$5,130
$5,130

$3,130
$3,130

$5,630
$5,630
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I. BACKGROUND

The territorial statute, as originally enacted in 1868, provided as
follows: 6
1. The procedure was to be available only if the decedent so specified
in his will and then only for the named executor.
2. The only court participation required was the establishment of
the will; thereafter the estate was to be "managed and settled without
the intervention of the probate court."
3. If the named executor should "fail to execute the trust faithfully"
the court could require that he thereafter proceed under the formal
probate procedure.
The pervasive weakness of the statue was its simplicity, bordering
on naivet6, for the plain fact is that the words "managed and settled
without the intervention of the probate court" were too elliptic. Did
the legislature expect that the decedent's will would specify to the
executor the detail of what he was expected and empowered to do? Or,
did it believe that the executor, like the instituted heir of Roman law,'
was to behave much as an ordinary person would act with reference to
his own property but subject to suit as the continued personality of the
decedent? Or, was it contemplated possibly that the non-intervention
executor was to be a sort of trustee; if so, what were his powers and
his duties?
Furthermore, the very fact that the non-intervention executor was
apparently so completely removed from the court raised the question
whether the legislature really meant what it said. Was the nonintervention executor really to be wholly outside the regular probate?
For example, if a non-intervention executor purported to follow the
ordinary statutory procedure to determine the rights of creditors, could
he preclude potential creditors in the same way that an ordinary executor could? Or could an intestate taker use the regular statutory
procedure for will contests if he wished to challenge a will being administered by a non-intervention executor? This ambiguity has never
6
Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1868, at 49, here as re-arranged and re-stated for brevity.
The statute in its present form appears as WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.68.010-.040 (1956).
7 For a description of the Roman process of testamentary execution see Gorni, THE

TESTAMENTARY EXECUTOR IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE

1-12 (1901).

Goffin traces

the origin of the testamentary executor of English law, from which the counterpart in
American law derives, to the salunmn of Germanic law, not to Roman law. His discussion is detailed and documented on pages 13-35, especially page 33 of the above
work.
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been resolved. Indeed, the situation has been aggravated with the
passage of time, as both the court and the legislature shuttle between
the two positions, sometimes applying the regular statutes to the nonintervention executor, at other times insisting on his independence of
those same statutes.
In addition, while the statute provided relief if "the trust ... is not
faithfully discharged," the remedy was too drastic-the court was
empowered to change the proceeding into the regular, formal probate; 8
what was needed was a method to hold the non-intervention executor
to an acceptable standard of behavior while still observing his essential
non-intervention characteristic.
Of crucial importance, the statute also failed to provide finality for
action taken by the non-intervention executor.
These inadequacies taken alone might not have proved so devastating to the underlying objective of the statute had the task of supplying
the missing pieces fallen to persons committed to preserving the system's basic characteristic-the executor's independence from the court.
But the task fell not to the reformers but to the very lawyers and judges
whose habits, cautions, and only tools fostered the same procedural
profusion which had given rise to the problem which the legislature
had sought to solve. In their hands and in the hands of the lawyerlegislators, the remedies were sought from the familiar-the regular
probate procedure-and, as might be expected, were piecemeal corrections as particular problems became acute. That approach has
persisted to this day, temporizing with or even ignoring the basic
inadequacies. The result is that they have yet to be scrutinized in
broad sweep. Certainly the time has come to do so.
Thus it seems apparent that the legislature's desire to provide a
simple, easy, economical method was defeated by an excess of enthusiasm.' Simplification reduced to the two words, "managed" and "settled," was over-simplification. Given the intention to create an independent executor, the legislature should have given this person some of
the characteristics of a modem administrative officer-at the minimum
to include a specification of powers, conclusiveness to actions taken,
and amenability to court control commensurate with the need for
protection of persons interested in the winding-up process. Put in other
s NVAsH. REv. CODE § 11.68.030 (1956).
0 This enthusiasm carried over to the next year. In 1869 the territorial legislature
provided a somewhat similar procedure for the administration of intestate estates.
Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1869, at 298. It was short-lived, disappearing in the re-enact-

ment of the entire probate code in 1873. Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1873, at 252, 329.
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terms, the process of winding up is largely ministerial and usually
non-litigious; the court should be involved only when there is need for
its strong arm or its adjudicative capacity. Other contact is unnecessary and costly.
How this result could have been obtained, indeed, how it could still
be obtained today, may be suggested from a study of what actually
did happen in the statute's history.
II.

SETTING THE BASIC PATTERN-THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS

The original non-intervention statute of 1868 lasted nearly thirty
years without substantial legislative modification. During this period
the ellipsis of the statute and its uncertain relationship to the regular
probate procedure brought litigation and practical difficulties in dealing
with the decedent's property, creating problems of such proportion
that major change in the non-intervention scheme became necessary.
One pressure for change, felt widely in the lawyers' day-to-day
practice, came from the need for finality. One appellate decision, 0
coming just after the effective date of the new legislation but applying
the former law, exemplified this reign of uncertainty. In this case the
court held that even though the non-intervention executor had followed
the procedure for publication of notice to creditors which was prescribed under the regular probate scheme, he could not thereby gain
the finality which an ordinary executor would have achieved. The
creditor was thus able to sue two and one-half years after publication
of notice even though he had not filed his claim during the one-year
period allowed by the regular non-claim statute. In other words,
10 Moore v. Kirkman, 19 Wash. 605, 54 Pac. 24 (1898). In respondents' brief in
the case appears this comment:
In a somewhat lengthy experience, we recall no instance where attorneys, in
passing upon abstracts of title, have been willing to certify as absohtely dear,
upon the record, of any possible lien to arise in futuro, any title which depended
upon the settlement of an estate out of court. They have advised that the purchaser must be guided by the probabilities, and rely upon evidence de hors the
record or upon the general statutes of limitations. This consensus of opinion led
to the adoption of the Act of 1895, (Laws of 1895, p. 197) to quiet titles. (Emphasis in original.) Brief for Respondent, p. 5.
Compare the statement in appellants' brief:
We dare say that one-half of the wills under which estates have been settled and
distributed during the past twenty years in this state have contained a provision
similar to the will in this case, providing for the non-intervention of the probate
court. It has been the common practice to settle these estates at the end of the
year if possible. The funds in the hands of executors have been paid out and the
real estate has been distributed to the legatees, who have taken it, believing it to
be their own, and their title has heretofore passed as a good title. Brief for Appellants, pp. 31-32.

NON-INTERVENTION EXECUTOR

although publication of notice may have been a convenience for the
non-intervention executor, it was nothing more. 1
A second need concerned the buying and selling of land and its use
in money lending. Here, in addition to the complications which arose
from the uncertain relationship of the non-intervention executorship to
the regular probate, there was a general uncertainty about the devolution of land upon death, particularly whether there was any need at all
for a probate proceeding, ordinary or non-intervention. Although the
court had quite early taken a firm position that a probate proceeding
was essential, holding in one case12 that the intestate takers of Blackacre could not maintain an action against adverse possessors without
alleging the entry of a decree of probate distributing Blackacre to them,
later cases' 3 backed away from that position. Unfortunately, these
cases did not provide a clear basis for assurance that the passage of
time alone, from the death of decedent, would give the intestate taker
the capacity to deal with the land.
A third pressure for change arose from the need of creditors as a
group to collect promptly and to distribute fairly among themselves.
The particular problem was a lack of openness.' With no public
accounting or inventorying, the scant public record of a decedent's
estate under a non-intervention executorship gave little information
useful to a creditor, who understandably would like to have had at
least a general picture of the assets and liabilities. The problem was
compounded if the estate happened to be insolvent, for then problems
of the ranking of creditors and the order of abatement of assets became important." It is likely, too, that the hard times of the 1890's
gave further strength to the demand for change.
11 The court may have felt that its decision was not so drastic as it appeared, because some six months before the appellants' brief was filed the legislature had
amended the non-intervention statute to provide a non-claim procedure for non-intervention executors. Neither the opinion nor the briefs mention the fact. Wash. Sess.
Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 285. See text accompanying notes 16-21 infra. The reference in
respondents' brief, note 10 supra, to the "Act of 1895" is to legislation providing for
direct succession to the title of real property and a six-year cut-off from the reach of
creditors, discussed in text accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
12 Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497, 30 Pac. 648 (1892) ; cf. Dunn v. Peterson, 4 Wash.
170, 29 Pac. 998 (1892).
'13Christofferson v. Pfennig, 16 Wash. 491, 48 Pac. 264 (1897)
(decided after
amending legislation, applying former law) ; Hazelton v. Bogardus, 8 Wash. 102, 35
Pac. 602 (1894) ; Hill v. Young, 7 Wash. 33, 34 Pac. 144 (1893).
4 The difficulties apparently arose only in lawyers' practices and in trial court
rulings in non-intervention executorships, for they were not reinforced or augmented
by appellate decisions.
15The opinion in State ex tel. Cox v. Superior Court, 21 Wash. 575, 59 Pac. 483
(1899), applying law pre-dating the amendment of 1897, shows some of the frustrations created by the lack of openness. In a petition to require the filing of an inventory
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The rough convergence of these three pressures produced major
legislation in 1895 and 1897.
Part of the legislation, dealing directly with the non-intervention
executorship, provided a non-claim procedure for the non-intervention
executor and certain disclosure and related relief for creditors in those
estates. 6 The non-claim procedure was substantially identical to that
provided for regular probate; indeed, part of the statute simply referred to the regular probate statutes for certain detail about the
notice." The disclosure and related relief for creditors was given more
individual treatment. First, an inventory was to be filed "in the manner
required by existing laws." 8 Next was a quite new idea: the nonintervention executor was not to proceed in that capacity, i.e., in a
manner different from the ordinary executor, until "it also duly appears
to the court, by the inventory filed, and other proof, that the estate is
fully solvent .... I'll Further, the non-intervention executor, unlike the

ordinary executor, was required to act on creditors' claims 0 within a
specified time.",
Related legislation directly attacked the problem of the mobility of
land. One section22 simply provided that land was not to respond to the
decedent's debts unless letters testamentary or of administration were
issued within six years of death. The other section23 was more profound. Traceable, presumably, to a desire to circumvent the prior insistence of the court upon probate proceedings even in intestacy, the
legislature now declared that land descended or passed directly to the
and for other relief, the creditor claimed that although the decedent had substantial
assets no inventory or other statement of the condition of the estate had been filed,
that the executors had so managed the estate that the petitioner had been unable to
obtain payment of her judgment, and that she could not even decide what steps could
next be taken. As it happened, the creditor was not a creditor in the ordinary sense,
her judgment running against a devisee, not the decedent; for this reason the court
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was not interested in the estate.
Had the petitioner been an ordinary creditor, the lack of information would have been
unduly harsh, and some remedy should have been made available. For further discussion of notice and openness, see text accompanying notes 173-80 in!fra, as part of a
current proposal.
16 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 285.
1 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 287.
18 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 285.
19 Ibid.
20 The statutory language is, "shall be paid. ... " No provision was made for contesting claims. Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 285.
21 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 285.
22 Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 198. This section was amended by 1965 legislation to include all property of the decedent, effective July 1, 1967. Wash. Sess. Laws
1965,
ch. 145, at 8.
23
Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 197.
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intestate takers or to the devisees upon the instant of death."' This
declaration, it will be recognized, was but an enactment of the concept
of devolution as it had persisted in English law for centuries. At almost
the very moment that England abandoned the concept, in 1897, the
state of Washington thus saw fit to re-affirm the ancient learning. 5
24 The Washington statute is not unique. The Model Probate Code, Appendix A,
304-05 (Michigan Legal Studies 1946) lists eighteen states with similar statutes.
25 The evolution in English law was slow and complex. Like much else in English

law, the development of the substantive concepts was inextricably tied to the history
of the various court systems, common law, chancery and ecclesiastic, and the surges
and ebbs of their respective power and influence. Very briefly stated, the more recent
aspects of that evolution are:
Personal property from early time has been conceived to pass to the administrator
or executor, as it does to this day. TURRENTINE, CASES AND TEXT ON WILLS AND
ADmiNISTRATION 2, 346-47 (2d ed. 1962) ; ATYINSON, WILLS 562 (2d ed. 1953).
Real property, by contrast, was not dependent on the administrator or executor as
a conduit of title. As to descent, where there was no will, Professor Costigan said:
Even in eighteenth century English law, there were no preliminary administration proceedings on the death of a tenant in fee simple or fee tail. The heir was
entitled to enter at once. Likewise, there were no necessary formal proceedings to
determine heirship. If a claimant's title to heirship was disputed, the dispute was
fought out in a contest at law over the right to possession of land. COSTIGAN,
CASES ON WILLS, DESCENT AND A=nnIsTRATioN 5 (3d ed. 1941).
Nor was the devolution of land under the terms of a will established or verified by
probate proceedings; rather, the will was treated as a muniment of title, to be used
much as a deed as the necessity for proof of title might arise. The practice in the first
half of the nineteenth century is described by Serjeant Adams:
Where the devise is of a freehold interest, the devisee may immediately, and
without any possession, maintain ejectment for the lands devised ....
... the original will must be produced.... If the will be lost, an e.xamined copy
of it should be produced, or parol evidence may be given of its contents; but the
probate, under the seal of the Ecclesiastical Court, will not be admitted as secondary evidence, because the Ecclesiastical Court has no control over devises of lands.
ADAms, EJECTMENT 74, 267, 270 (3d ed. 1830).
In 1857, however, in a move designed primarily to take probate powers away from
the ecclesiastic courts, Parliament created a new court in the common law systemthe Probate Court. This legislation gave to the new court not only the powers of the
ecclesiastic courts with respect to personal property but also the power, at least when
some personal property was also disposed of by the same will, to adjudicate the validity of that will as it effected the devolution of real property. The Court of Probate
Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, §§ 61-64.
Then in 1897 Parliament took the last step: The Land Transfer Act of 1897 provided that "real estate.., shall, on his death, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition, devolve to and become vested in his personal representative.., as if it were
a chattel real ... " and that it "shall be administered in the same manner... as if it were
personal estate...." 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, §§ 1-1, 2-3.
Professor Atldnson has admirably sketched this segment of English history in his

article, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction,8 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1943).
This article, incidentally, also includes an excellent bibliography.

It should be apparent that Washington's error was not its failure to anticipate Parliament's 1897 direction, as such, that land was to devolve to.the personal representative; rather, it was its failure to do that which Parliament did in that legislation-to
treat real and personal property alike. Certainly a probate system can be designed to
operate effectively under either concept, i.e., title passing through the personal representative or directly to the ultimate taker as long as power is in the executor or administrator to make reasonable disposition as among takers, as by partition, but there was
no excuse except historical to perpetuate the distinction.
Although from a slightly different context, the following statement is apt:
It is in the province of inheritance that our medieval law made its worst nis-
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Its only concessions to modernity were two added qualifications, that
"no person shall be deemed a devisee until the will has been probated""Is and that the devolution of title was "subject to his debts,
family allowance, expenses of administration, and any other charges
for which real estate is liable under existing laws.""Ir This statute did
not mention non-intervention executorships.
Another change in the non-intervention statute purported to facilitate the sale of property during the winding-up period, by providing
that the non-intervention executor could sell real and personal property
of the decedent where the will so authorized, without a court order and
without notice or confirmation."8
These statutory changes, it should be noted, perpetuated rather than
resolved the underlying ambiguity of the non-intervention executorship, i.e., that in some situations it was considered to be part of the
regular probate procedure and in others to be wholly separate, quite
without a unifying or basic rationale to explain or predict the result.
All of the statutory changes had strong impetus from the deficiencies
takes. They were natural mistakes. There was much to be said for the simple plan
of giving all the land to the eldest son [title thus passing directly, as to land].
There was much to be said for allowing the courts of the church to assume a
jurisdiction, even an exclusive jurisdiction, in testamentary causes [title thus
passing to the personal representative, as to personalty]. We can hardly blame
our ancestors for their dread of intestacy without attacking their religious beliefs.
But the consequences have been evil. We rue them at the present day, and shall
rue them so long as there is talk of real and personal property.
2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 361 (1895). (The comment
in brackets has been added to bolster the author's perception of relevance to the text
of this note.)
26 Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 198. Thus, while title to land may be conceived to pass directly to the heir or to the devisee, the statute apparently requires
probate of the will. Practically, the statute may be unyielding although, as Professor
Atkinson points out, this proviso is merely an insistence upon a certain type of proof
of the will. ATKINSON, WILLS 503-05 (2d ed. 1953). It requires no more, incidentally,
than admission of the will to probate; it does not require an order of final distribution,
although such an order might on occasion adjudicate the interpretation of the will.
The court has taken this position with respect to a will in a non-intervention proceeding. See Peck v. Peck, 76 Wash. 548, 137 Pac. 137 (1913), where the court allowed
the prosecution of a suit to quiet title to real property by a devisee under the will, describing the proven will as a muniment of title.
27 Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 197. Title insurance companies thus understandably prefer the entry of a final decree closing the estate, filed receipts, etc. In
non-intervention proceedings, the 1955 legislature's provision for a declaration of
completion serves somewhat the same purpose. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.68.010 (1956).
See text accompanying notes 101, 154-55 infra.
28 One might well ask whether this addition helped more than it hurt. Without the
amendment, the power of sale of the property was probably already in the non-intervention executor, just from the language of the original 1868 enactment, especially if
the broad intent of the statute be given effect. Certainly the amendment did not
answer the question whether a non-intervention executor's sale need conform to the
other sections of the general probate statutes which limited the purposes for which
property of the decedent could be sold. For further discussion see text accompanying
notes 33, 87-98 infra.
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of the pre-1895 non-intervention procedure; all of them substantially
changed or affected the non-intervention procedure. Yet, taken as a
whole, the changes were inconsistent: some were effected by change in
language directly within the non-intervention statutes; some were
effected by new language wholly outside; and some, while appearing
within the non-intervention statutes, referred to the regular probate
for needed detail. Was the non-intervention procedure separate or was
it not?
The answer was not in the offing, even though during the next interval, a twenty-year period ending with a complete revision of the probate statutes in 1917, the supreme court of the state dealt with the
non-intervention executorship in three important specific areas: creditors' claims, the executor's power to deal with property and contractual
affairs of the decedent, and allowances to the surviving spouse and
family.
The legislative changes of the mid-1890's proved inadequate to avoid
continued difficulty with creditors' claims. Obviously plagued by the
continued and unresolved question whether any sections of the regular
probate procedure were to apply to the non-intervention executor, the
court attempted to make sense of the piecemeal snatches at the problem
to be found in that legislation.
The 1897 amendment provided only that the publication of notice be
in the manner provided for regular probate and that the creditor would
be barred for failure to present his claim to the executor within the
year's time thus allowed. Nothing was said whether the executor had
to present the claim to the court for approval; nothing was said concerning the procedure to be followed should the creditor wish to sue on
his claim. Were these matters, too, to be governed by the regular
probate's non-claim procedure?
The court straddled the fence. In a 1908 case29 it assumed, apparently without argument, that a creditor suing a non-intervention
executor had to allege not only the presentment of his claim within the
one-year period, but also, as required by the regular probate statutes,
the rejection of his claim by the non-intervention executor. On the
other hand, a 1916 case30 held that the non-intervention executor need
not follow that portion of the regular probate procedure which required
the presentment of a claim to the judge for approval. 31
2

Foley v. McDonnell, 48 Wash. 272, 93 Pac. 321 (1908).

30
Schubach v. Redelscheimer, 92 Wash. 124, 158 Pac. 739 (1916).
3

1 Ibid. In this case the executor was himself the creditor. A special statute in the
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As with those sections which dealt with creditors' claims, the provisions of the 1897 legislation specifying the non-intervention executor's
power to sell property were also inadequate. Did the section authorizing non-intervention executors to sell "where the will authorizes them
so to do..." 32 mean that such power could be found only when specifically provided in the will? Not until 1913 did the court answer
this question. Holding that the power need not be specified in the
will, 3 the court pointed out that to restrict the non-intervention executor's sales to those specifically authorized by the decedent would be to
restrict him even more severely than was the ordinary executor; if
different at all, the non-intervention executor was to have more freedom, not less, than his ordinary counterpart.
The influence of the non-intervention statute on the availability of
family allowances and similar awards was dramatic but apparently
quite short-lived. Taking the idea that the executor was truly to be
independent of the court, the supreme court in 1911 reversed the trial
court for granting a widow's petition for a family allowance in a nonintervention proceeding." The position of the court was clear and
simple: the non-intervention statute gave to the executor, not to the
court, the powers and duties incident to winding up the affairs of the
decedent. If there was to be any allowance to the widow, the application had to be made to the executor, at least "in the first instance." 35
The court recognized that if the executor should refuse any allowance
or should the amount allowed prove to be inadequate, relief should be
available to the widow; on the other hand, that relief, said the court,
would be granted by the court in exercise of its equity powers, not as
incident to probating the decedent's estate, nor, apparently, need it be
in the same amount as provided in the regular probate statutes.
The one case in point which reached the supreme court within the
next few years36 directly applied the holding of the earlier case,
although only as incident to an action involving more than the correctness of an allowance. The widow in this later case had brought an
regular probate procedure repeated the general requirement that claims be presented to
the judge for approval, then further provided that such approval would be "sufficient
evidence of its correctness." Wash. Sess. Laws 1891, ch. 155, § 27, at 387. The court
was not persuaded that the specificity of this statute implied its reach to the nonintervention
executorship.
3
2 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, § 3, at 286.
33 Fulmer v. Gable, 73 Wash. 684, 132 Pac. 641 (1913).
See text accompanying
note
28 supra, for further discussion of this statute.
3
4 In re Guye's Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 114 Pac. 1041 (1911).
3r Id. at 171, 114 Pac. at 1043.
3S Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 Pac. 1025 (1913).
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action to establish that certain property being administered was community property rather than her husband's separate property. Incident
to that action the court allowed her claim of homestead upon one parcel
of land which was the husband's separate property, saying that she
had properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court in this equitable
action rather than having asserted her claim in the regular probate
proceeding.
The inability of the non-intervention executor to preclude creditors
prior to the 1897 amendments, which provided a non-claim procedure,
had a similar and more drastic parallel in the inability of the nonintervention executor to achieve a general finality to his actions. A
1902 case3 forcefully made the point. In this case a non-intervention
executrix held several shares of common stock of a national bank which
failed sometime after the death of the decedent. Levying an assessment on the stock, the receiver of the bank demanded payment by the
executrix. She ignored the demand and proceeded instead to file a
final account, giving notice to all interested persons including the
receiver. Then she took a decree of final distribution which did not call
for payment of the assessment. Thereafter the receiver sought to have
the executrix removed as such and the estate affairs properly handled,
i.e., have the assessment paid and thus ignore the final account and
decree of distribution. The court agreed with the receiver, saying that
the decree was meaningless since such final accounting and decree were
available only to ordinary executors, not to non-intervention executors."'
Many of the annoyances caused by these few cases of this twentyyear interim were dealt with in the 1917 revision of the entire probate
statutory scheme." This revision, an entire re-writing of the statutes,
was, however, only major housecleaning, not real innovation; and, it
appears, the non-intervention problems were only a minor part of the
concerns felt by the revisers.
Perhaps the most important of the revisions as to non-intervention
37 J re Macdonald's Estate, 29 Wash. 422, 69 Pac. 1111 (1902).
38 Some years later, in 1915, the court changed its mind on this point, holding that
a non-intervention executor could effectively take a decree of final distribution if he
chose to come into court with a final accounting and ask for court approval. Bayer v.
Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915). The court in that case correctly described
the discussion in the opinion of the 1902 case as dictum, since there had been some
additional litigation involving the same parties which dictated the result by res judicafa. The result of the 1915 case was incorporated in legislation in 1917, as discussed
in text accompanying note 41 infra. The rationale of the Bayer case is of major importance upon a different but related point. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
30 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 642.
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executorships dealt with the problem last mentioned-the accomplishment of finality to the actions of the non-intervention executor. The
remedy was obvious: simply bring the non-intervention executor back
into the regular procedure; or, to state the matter more accurately, let
him come back if he wanted to. The revision therefore specified"
that if the non-intervention executor wished to file a final account and
otherwise observe the formalities for notice and hearing, a final order
could be taken adjudging the correctness of the non-intervention
executor's actions and accounts and decreeing distribution of the property. This part of the 1917 legislation, it will be noted, followed the
lead shown by the court in a 1915 case4 ' in which it was held that a
non-intervention executor could effectively take such a decree.
Other remedies were less important and much less sweeping in their
application. One of these was to tidy the section specifying the nonintervention executor's power to sell property. As noted earlier, it took
an appellate decision" to make it clear that the reference in the statute
to the non-intervention executor's having a power of sale "where the
will so provides" did not affirmatively require the specification of that
power in the will. The legislature decided to eliminate all remaining
doubt, although there should have been none. It simply eliminated the
qualifying clause."
Another legislative remedy of the 1917 revision took quite a different
approach. Until 1917 all changes explicitly affecting the non-intervention executorship had been made only in those statutory sections which
provided for and governed the non-intervention executor. With respect
to one minor problem, however, the 1917 legislature took the opposite
approach, reaching into the regular probate procedure sections and
there specifying that a particular section was also to apply to the nonintervention executorship." The problem was minor: need a nonintervention executor who is himself a creditor present his claim to the
judge for approval? The legislature decided that he did, thus changing
the rule of a 1916 case4" holding the contrary.
40 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 666.

41 Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915), discussed, note 38 Mspra and
in text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
42 Fulmer v. Gable, 73 Wash. 684, 132 Pac. 641 (1913).
This decision is discussed
in text accompanying note 33 supra.
43 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 667. This change survives in the current code.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.68.040 (1956).
44 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 675.
This type of legislative action with
respect to non-intervention executors was repeated in 1965. Wash. Sess. Laws 1965,
ch. 145, at 79. See note 153 infra.
45 Schubach v. Redelscheimer, 92 Wash. 124, 158 Pac. 739 (1916).
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The most subtle of the 1917 changes, however, concerned the basic
relationship of the non-intervention executor to the decedent's creditors. After having in 1897 specifically provided a non-claim procedure
for the non-intervention executor, the legislature in 1917 completely
eliminated these provisions, substituting only that the executor
was to give notice to creditors "in the manner required by existing
laws." 4 Was this meant to re-institute the pre-1897 law, under which
the notice to creditors was to "be convenient,"" and nothing more?
Surely not, for this would have meant that he could not preclude creditors at all; but the opposite conclusion was equally startling. This
would mean that the legislature must now intend that the non-intervention executor is to have available to him, and, indeed, may be
required to follow, the full sweep of the non-claim procedures for
ordinary executors, quite without explicit direction of such a result.
If so, the non-intervention procedure was, at least as to creditors'
claims, fully absorbed into the regular procedure.
The court made the obvious choice. In a 1919 case4 " it held that the
regular non-claim statute did apply to the non-intervention procedure,
thus barring a creditor who failed to file a verified claim within the
regular time. The reasoning was ingenious. The 1917 code, being a
complete re-enactment of all probate procedures, was to be read as an
integrated whole.40 Words previously having a restricted meaning because the non-intervention statutes had been enacted later were now
to have a meaning based on the integration accomplished by the 1917
legislation. It followed that since the regular non-claim sections prescribed a non-claim procedure for "every executor""0 and required a
40 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, § 92, at 666.
47 Moore v. Kirkman, 19 Wash. 605, 609, 54 Pac. 24, 26 (1898). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
48 First Security & Loan Co. v. Englehart, 107 Wash. 86, 181 Pac. 13 (1919).
40 The court in the First Security case did not notice, incidentally, that the legislature had once before, in 1873, completely re-enacted the probate statutes as a unit,
including the 1868 non-intervention statute. Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1873, at 252,
§§ 128, 366. (The Code of 1881 also re-stated the entire set of probate statutes but only
as "continuations" of "existing statutes." Code of Washington 1881 §§ 1297-1686,
3319.) An argument similar to that made in the First Security case appeared subsequently, in In re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn. 2d 509, 518, 101 P2d 968, 971 (1940). Here,
by dictum, relying on the integrated nature of the 1917 re-enactment, the court used
one of the 1917 "General Provisions" to suggest that in the absence of specific statutory
provision to the contrary it had the power in a non-intervention proceeding to do
anything it deemed "right and proper." Given its application to non-intervention proceedings, the statute does seem that broad. See Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, § 219,
at 706. See also note 121 infra, for a more recent instance of the court's use of a
general statute, without even stating the integration argument for support.
ro Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, § 107, at 672.
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verification of "every claim,"'" these sections were intended to apply
literally and in their entirety to non-intervention proceedings. 2
During the course of the development of the foregoing detail-the
creditors' claims problems, the power to deal with the decedent's
property, and the like-there persisted the necessity, felt by lawyers,
judges, and to a limited extent legislators, to have some doctrinal basis
for the results being reached.
First, as a matter of definition, it seems to have been assumed that
the distinction between the non-intervention executor and the regular
executor applied only to matters of procedure, not to matters of
substance, even though several matters of substance were contained
in the regular probate statutes and not repeated in the non-intervention
statute. For example, that separate property undisposed of by will
should pass one-half to the surviving spouse and one-half to a child
was fairly obviously a matter of substance, and whether the intestacy
as to that property might occur in the case of a decedent who left a
non-intervention will or an ordinary will would not affect its devolution. 3 On the other hand, whether and in what amount a surviving
spouse would be given a family allowance might depend on the type of
51 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, § 108, at 673.

52 It is not clear that the court appreciated the implications of its argument. By
the author's count the words "every executor" appear in five places in the 1917 statute,
the words "any executor" in ten places, and the words "no executor" in three places.
Their incidence is completely random. Furthermore, there is little reason to stop the
argument with combinations of "every" or similar adjectives with "executor"; the
word "executor" standing alone hardly implies an exclusion of any special class of
executors, such as non-intervention executors. The word "executor" without any of
these three adjectives appears 168 times in the 1917 statute, also at random.
The difficulty recurred in 1965, when the entire probate code was again re-enacted,
with many revisions. See Washington State Bar Ass'n, Commentary To Recommended Changes in Title 11 RCW, §§ 11.28.237, 11.68.010 (1964), and Stewart &
Steincipher, Probate Reform in Washington, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 873, 891 n.103 (1965).
Since a committee of the Washington State Bar Association drafted the 1965 legislation, perhaps the statement in its Commentary that: "[tjhe use of the term 'personal
representative' in this section [requiring mailed notice of the commencement of proceedings] is intended to include an executor under a non-intervention will" and the
supporting argument will be persuasive, even though it seems apparent that in most
other parts of the 1965 legislation where "personal representative" appears the nonintervention executor is not "intended to be included." Perhaps the definitional section
of the 1965 legislation can be said to make the distinction possible, although it does
not encourage it: "When used in this title, unless otherwise required from the context: (1) 'Personal representative' includes executor, administrator, special administrator, and guardian.... (12) 'Executor' means a personal representative of the estate
of a decedent appointed by will and the term may be used in lieu of 'personal representative' wherever required by context ....
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 1, 3.
The committee's comment to the definitional section is broad: "(1) 'Personal representative' is defined in this section as including executors, administrators, personal representatives and guardians, and is used as an inclusive term throughout the Title." Commentary § 11.02.005.
-3The words, "seems to have been assumed," in the preceding sentence were used
advisedly, for the proposition here noted has not been the subject of articulated decision
in the appellate court.
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executorship. 4 Similarly, that title to land should by statute be declared
to pass directly from the decedent to the beneficial takers would probably be considered a matter of substance."
There is very little in either the regular probate statutes or in the
non-intervention statute to suggest this distinction. Yet the general
subject of the non-intervention statute seems to be primarily procedure: it uses such words as "manner," "settle," and "manage"; 1
it does not purport to prescribe who gets what property.
Beyond this general distinction between substance and procedure,
however, the original non-intervention statute did refer specifically to
one part of the regular probate statute: the will had to be admitted
"to probate ...in the manner required by existing laws."" Thus,
when it came to admitting a non-intervention will to probate, the
substance-procedure distinction would require that the will conform to
the regular statute as to the number of witnesses and other formalities
incident to the execution of a will. On the other hand, the manner by
which the will would be proved for admission to probate, such as
whether both subscribing witnesses had to testify, would not be a
substantive matter. Here, the specific reference in the non-intervention
statute to the requirements of the regular statute would be employed,
to require conformance to the detail there specified.
But these two ideas were of limited usefulness. Certainly the substance-procedure distinction was going to be difficult in application,
as it was, for example, in the family allowance case. And, the use of
the regular probate procedure for admitting the will was, of course,
confined to that narrow subject. On a much broader basis, then, some
general category or rationale was sought to explain the nature and
status of the non-intervention proceeding.
It was obvious that if the non-intervention executorship could be
assimilated into some known and familiar category its characteristics
would be thereby established, and there would be no need to delineate
new ones. Fortunately for the court the statute itself gave the clue:
the magic word was "trust," appearing four times in the statute.58
54 In re Guye's Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 114 Pac. 1041 (1911).
65 Peck v. Peck, 76 Wash. 548, 137 Pac. 137 (1913).
513Probate Practice Act of 1863, § 2, at 49; currently WASH. Rxv.
(1956).

CoDE

§ 11.68.010

Ibid.
53 Ibid. These appearances are all within that portion of the statute which specifies
67

the circumstances in which the non-intervention executorship was to be unavailable or
changed to an ordinary proceeding: if the named executor should "decline to execute
the trust"; if he "shall fail to execute the trust faithfully"; if "the trust... is not
faithfully discharged"; and "failing and neglecting to execute the trust."
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Thus the court said that a non-intervention executorship is the administration of a trusty
While credit must be given to the court for recognizing the spirit in
which the 1868 statute was passed, the court really had little alternative. To have put the executor back into the regular probate setting
would have offended the language, "without the intervention of the
court." At the other extreme, for the court to have found no slot in
which to fit the non-intervention executorship would have been highly
unsatisfactory, for where would the court turn for a delineation of
powers and duties? Looking back now, perhaps we can say that the
court should have taken the position that the statute was hopelessly
inadequate and that the next ensuing legislature would therefore be
expected to specify some powers and duties for the non-intervention
executor. Yet the practical nature of the judges surely would have
rebelled against that thought; it must have seemed much better to
seize on the trust language. Here was a relationship of long established
and highly useful characteristics, one which in many respects was not
greatly different from ordinary executorship, and one fairly well
suited to handle many of the incidents to winding up the affairs of a
decedent.
As a trustee for both the creditors and the testate or intestate
takers, the non-intervention executor would provide the necessary
stewardship during the period of adjustment following the settlor's
death, doing those tasks executors always do, and when he was finished
he would deliver the property to those entitled. Furthermore, should
court assistance be necessary, it was familiar trust law that the court
is always available to aid a trustee in accomplishing the purposes of
his trust. Similarly, the beneficiaries of the trust would be given
adequate protection under familiar doctrines of trust law. And, last,
as trustee the non-intervention executor would have the same legal
title and powers as ordinary trustees and thus be able effectively to
deal with outsiders.
59 See Fulmer v. Gable, 73 Wash. 684, 686, 132 Pac. 641, 642 (1913). Other similar
statements appear in the cases cited in note 64 infra. It must be obvious that the trust
language in that statute need not have been taken strictly and literally. It was common in that day, and perhaps to a lesser extent today, for courts, lawyers and legislatures to blur the distinction between executors and trustees. For example, the 1917
re-enactment of the Washington probate statutes, in the sections other than those
dealing with non-intervention executors, frequently uses trust language, in phrases
such as "accept the trust," "discharge every trust,.... proceed in the execution of his
trust," and the like. Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 654, 655, 662. See also the
will and the opinion in In re Cornetts' Estate, 102 Wash. 254, 173 Pac. 44 (1918), discussed note 65 infra, for a thorough and unfortunate blending of executorship and
trusteeship.
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This analysis, however, was not adequate. The basic difficulty lay
in the assumption that the functions of an executor and of a trustee
were sufficiently alike to make an easy assimilation. The root of the
matter is that a winding up is not the same as the continuing management normally involved in the administration of a trust. Thus, without
a delineation of specific powers with respect to determining, paying,
and concluding the interests of the decedent's creditors, simply to
label the non-intervention executorship a trust was inadequate to the
task." Or, to put another instance, without a delineation of a specific
procedure for determining and effectuating a widow's statutory award,
merely to constitute the non-intervention executorship a trust was
again wholly inadequate."
For a while there appeared some possibility that the decedent's will
could be expected to furnish the needed delineation of this new trustee's
powers and duties. There is indeed some suggestion in the language of
the non-intervention statute of this result.2 Thus, if a particular decedent should himself specify the manner in which his non-intervention
executor was to determine and preclude creditors of the decedent,
such as the type of notice to publish and the procedure the creditors
were to follow in presenting their claims, such procedure would be
used by that particular non-intervention executor.6
The suggestion seems highly impractical, for we could hardly expect
60 E.g., Moore v. Kirkman, 19 Wash. 605, 54 Pac. 24 (1898).

1 E.g., In re Guye's Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 114 Pac. 1041 (1911).
Probate Practice Act of 1863, § 2 at 49; currently WAsH. Rxv. CODE § 11.68.010
(1956). The statute provides that where it is specified in the will "that the estate shall
be settled in a manner provided in such last will and testament.. ." the estate is to be
managed and settled without the intervention of the court. (Emphasis added.)
63 Such a proposition was argued in Moore v. Kirkman, 19 Wash. 605, 54 Pac. 24
(1898); see Brief for Respondents pp. 5-6; Reply Brief for Appellants pp. 5-7. The
court, however, decided that the executor had no power to preclude creditors by notice
to submit claims within a prescribed time. For further discussion of this aspect of the
case, see text accompanying note 10 infra.
There are cases, too, in which the court says that the non-intervention executor's
powers derive from the will, not from the court. This statement has not, however,
been made to support the proposition that the decedent could therefore, in his will,
prescribe the detail of how the executor should act, as he might publish a notice to
creditors, effectively to preclude creditors; rather, it has usually been made to support
the characterization of the non-intervention executor as a trustee. See, e.g., Fulmer v.
Gable, 73 Wash. 684, 686, 132 Pac. 641, 642 (1913) ; State ex rel. Phinney v. Superior
Court, 21 Wash. 186, 193, 57 Pac. 337, 339 (1899). In the latter case the court's
description that the non-intervention executor "derives his powers, not from the court,
but from the will" was apparently thought necessary in order to fill an imagined gap
in the symmetry of ownership and incidental powers to deal with property. The reasoning runs along the line that power to deal with property must have a source (in an
ordinary executorship, from the order of the court directing sale, for example) ; that
the non-intervention executor needs no order from the court before he can sell; and
that the source, therefore, must be found elsewhere. What better place to find it than
in the will of the decedent?
'32
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each creditor first to read the will and, assuming he found the provisions there set out, to conform to the varying procedures which each
different testator might require. Furthermore, such power in an
executor might well be abused, for despite his labelled trust relationship
to the creditors, the testator and the executor probably would feel less
kindly to creditor beneficiaries than to takers under the will.
Despite the inadequacies of the characterization of the non-intervention executor as a trustee, it has persisted."' With the passage of
time, however, the label has become nearly meaningless," for gradually
the court and the legislature have specified in detail the duties and
powers of the non-intervention executor, similar to those for ordinary
executors, relying less and less upon trust characteristics and more and
more upon those of the regular probate procedures."
A rationale which perhaps would have been more useful than the
trust characterization was argued to the court in an 1898 case, described earlier.67 In this case the non-intervention executor wanted to
take advantage of the non-claim statute prescribed for ordinary
executors, to preclude those creditors who did not file claims within the
year which that statute specified. The executor's argument as to why
he should be able to assert the ordinary non-claim statute, even though
it apparently was not available to him, was that the non-intervention
statute meant only that the court (i.e., the judge) was not to take part
64
1; re Krueger's Estate, 180 Wash. 165, 168, 39 P.2d 381, 383 (1934) ; Bayer v.
Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 435, 145 Pac. 433, 436 (1915).
65 The process was not without its difficult phase. In In re Cornett's Estate, 102
Wash. 254, 173 Pac. 44 (1918), the court was so thoroughly imbued with the trust
characterization that it refused to allow a fee for any work done by the fiduciary
(labeled "my executor and trustee") after the entry of the decree of solvency until the
youngest son of the decedent should reach twenty-one, since under the (true) trust
provisions the son was to receive income until that time. The court reasoned that
upon the entry of the decree of solvency the "trustee" commenced upon his duties
(paying decedent's creditors, etc.) and that trust law required him to wait until the
trust terminated before his fee could be fixed.
The court retreated from this position, however, in a substantially similar case
some twenty years later . In Jones v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P2d 915 (1935) the
"executors and trustees" resisted an action for attorneys' fees for services in handling
the probate of the estate under a non-intervention will on the ground that the fee was
not yet due. Similar to and relying upon Cornett's Estate, they argued that until the
life-income beneficiary should die such services had to be continued. The court held
that the fee for services was due, past due, five years before. The court said, "[ilt was
the function of the executors to collect the assets, pay the debts of the decedent and
other necessary expenses, and distribute the residue in accordance with the will....
We see no reason why the estate, so far as the duties of the executors were concerned,
was not complete and the estate ready for distribution in the latter part of the year
1930."
182 Wash. at 157-58, 45 P.2d at 919.
66
E.g., Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 823, 405 P2d 602
(1965), discussed in text accompany note 119 infra.
67 Moore v. Kirkman, 19 Wash. 605, 54 Pac. 24 (1898).
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in the non-intervention probate proceeding. Where, for example, the
regular non-claim statute might prescribe that the notice to creditors
was to be published as often as the court should order, the nonintervention statute would substitute as often as the non-intervention
executor should choose. This argument did not prevail. Perhaps it is
best that it did not, for three reasons. First, it would certainly invite
abuse, by the non-intervention executor who might provide unreasonably short and obscure times and other methods for submission of
claims. Second, it would produce a welter of different procedures in a
situation in which uniformity is desirable. Third, to have adopted
this rationale would have accomplished very little of the basic objective
of the 1868 legislation, for to have eliminated only the actual participation of the judge while in all other respects observing the filing and
reporting requirements would not have reduced the cumbersomeness
or detail of the probate proceeding very substantially.
The result of this lack of a really usable doctrinal basis for the
non-intervention executor, with the complete lack of a pervasive
specification whether any of the regular probate procedure statutes
were to control or to be available to him, was a completely haphazard
development of the law, knowable only in its specifics. One should
probably be sympathetic with this sort of development. The problems
were faced by men who wanted solutions to their narrow questions.
They were not generalists drafting broad policy. Furthermore, the
type of remedies adopted was also characteristic of the men to whom
the specific problems had come. Lawyers and judges sought out the
familiar-in this case the ordinary executorship-wherein to find their
solutions. What more easy and proper solution to a dearth of specification of powers and duties for non-intervention executor could be
found than to assimilate him back into the regular proceeding. That
in the process he should gradually become less and less that which he
started out to be was not of great concern, probably because the
changes were so small that no one looked at the process in its broad
perspective, to see that if it continued unslacked, the label "nonintervention" would come to be meaningless.
The one articulated conceptual analysis which did come out of this
fifty-year formative period arose about the turn of the century in
rudimentary form and was then refined toward the close of the era.
The concept was one of jurisdiction, somewhat ambiguous whether in
the sense of jurisdiction of the subject matter or in the sense of
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jurisdictional power in the court to do a particular act.6" The idea in a
general sense was that when the non-intervention executor was acting
in his non-intervention capacity his activities were somehow beyond
the jurisdictional reach of the court.
An important factor which contributed to the adoption of this
concept was the insistence in the early cases that the non-intervention
executor was actually a trustee. In so doing the court talked in terms
of the estate being "removed from the jurisdiction of the probate
court, 6 9 or that "no court is exercising or can exercise any jurisdiction
70 It should be noted that during this time the court failed to
over it."1
perceive or to state clearly the distinction between, on the one hand,
having "a probate court" and "an equity court", and on the other hand
having but one superior court to hear matters both in probate and in
equity but in which, for ease of administration, it would be wise to
insist upon separate causes for hearing the two types of cases. As a
matter of fact, the Washington constitution created the latter type of
court system, i.e., one superior court, to hear all matters.71 Yet, in order
to accomplish the desired effect, that the non-intervention executor
was to be free of court control, the court spoke of his being outside
the jurisdiction of the "probate court." At the same time, using the
idea that the executor was then a true trustee, the court said that he
must be subject to some control and therefore entertained suits of an
equitable nature, much as a beneficiary of an ordinary trust might
bring his trustee to account.72
From this beginning the next step appeared in the rationale for
Bayer v. Bayer," the case discussed earlier in which the court allowed
the non-intervention executor to take an order of final distribution
directly in the probate proceedings, giving it res judicata effect despite
his non-intervention status. In a strenuous effort to clear away the
68 The court seems to have settled on subject-matter type of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
the discussion in In re Coates' Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 250, 256, 347 P.2d 875, 878 (1959).
Compare the language of WalIa Walla v. Moore, 16 Wash. 339, 342, 47 Pac. 753, 754
(1897) (subject matter), with that of It re Guye's Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 172, 114 Pac.
1041, 1043 (1911) (to do a particular act).
69 Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 118, 135 Pac. 1025, 1028 (1913).
70
Walla Walla v. Moore, 16 Wash. 339, 342, 47 Pac. 753, 754 (1897).
13 WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 6.
furnishes a clear
72 Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 118, 135 Pac. 1025, 1028 (1913)
statement: "After a nonintervention will has been proven, the estate adjudged solvent
and the executors named in the will have accepted the trust, the estate is removed
from the jurisdiction of the probate court,... and courts of equity are, thereafter, the
proper forum for the determination of such issues as are here tendered." (Emphasis
added.) For an earlier case see Smith v. Smith, 15 Wash. 239, 46 Pac. 249 (1896).
73 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915).

19661

NON-INTERVENTION EXECUTOR

notion that there was "a probate court" and "an equity court," the
court described the constitutional origin of the single superior court
and its coverage, among other things, of "all cases in equity ... " and

"all matters in probate. 7' 4 The court concluded that although the nonintervention executor could presumably have obtained the same type
order from "the equity side" of the superior court, there was no reason
why the court in the probate cause itself ought not to be able to entertain the executor's petition. Yet, faced with the older cases which
described the non-intervention's status as being "outside the jurisdiction" of the "probate court," the court understandably used the language that the executor was now "invoking the jurisdiction" of the
7
court when he sought the final order. 1
The practice of the non-intervention executor's coming back into
court for a final order and this decision validating it were given
legislative sanction in the 1917 re-enactment of the probate statutes.78
Despite this express statutory authorization, the doctrine underlying
the practice persisted-that the non-intervention executor first comes
into court to get his status determined, i.e., that he is to act in the
non-intervention capacity, 7 then he goes "outside the jurisdiction" of
the court to perform most of his functions, then when he wishes to wind
up the proceeding he may, if he wishes, "come back into the jurisdic7
tion" of the court to get his final orderY.
The idea has not been particularly useful, for it did not furnish a guide to determine which aspects of
the regular probate proceedings were to apply to non-intervention executors. Furthermore, the concept had its harmful aspect, for it may
have produced an immunity for the non-intervention executor which
7
was not altogether desirable. 1

III. PERSISTENT UNCERTAINTY-THE PosT-1917 PERIOD

The first fifty years of the non-intervention executorship were
characterized by piecemeal remedies which failed to recognize the
basic problem, i.e., of purporting to create an independent executor
and expecting him to conduct a rather complicated process, but without
telling him how to do it and without giving him finality for what he
74
75

WASH. CONST. art. 4,

§ 6.

83 Wash. at 440, 145 Pac. at 437.

71Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 666.
77 The requirements include, as noted earlier, a showing of solvency. An order of
the court, albeit ex parte, is essential. In re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn. 2d 509, 101 P.2d
968 (1940) ; In re Beard's Estate, 60 Wn. 2d 127, 372 P.2d 530 (1962).
71 In re Coates' Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 250, 347 P.2d 875 (1959).
70 See discussion in text accompanying notes 133-41 infra.
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did, unless he came back or was brought back within the fold of the
regular probate procedure. In most respects the second fifty years
have simply continued the pattern.
Creditors' claims continue under the non-intervention executorship
to be handled substantially the same as under an ordinary executorship;8" on the other hand, sales and management of property under the
non-intervention executorship continue to be effected almost wholly
outside the regular executorship procedure; 8' allowances to the surviving spouse and family under the non-intervention executorship, after
the brief flurry of independence in the early 1900's,"2 continue to be
governed by the explicit provisions of the regular procedure; and
80 For example: (a) CoinpareJones v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P.2d 915 (1935),
with In re Fotheringham's Estate, 154 Wash. 130, 281 Pac. 337 (1929) and It re
Johnston's Estate, 107 Wash. 25, 181 Pac. 209 (1919) ; with all three of these compare
In re Krueger's Estate, 11 Wn. 2d 329, 119 P2d 312 (1941) (Is the executor or administrator to be surcharged if he pays a creditor who does not serve and file his otherwise valid claim when such payment is made during the period in which the claim
could have been served and filed? The three earlier cases hold that he is not to be
surcharged; the fourth and latest case may be a holding that he is to be surcharged,
although the stated facts do not establish when the payment to the creditor was made.) ;
(b) compare New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wn. 2d 825, 264 P2d 863 (1953),
with State ex rel. Patchett v. Superior Court, 60 Wn. 2d 784, 375 P2d 747 (1962)
(creditor seeking to establish his claim cannot hold the executor or administrator to
have waived the requirement of serving and filing the claim during the non-claim
period) ; (c) compare Horton v. McCord, 158 Wash. 563, 291 Pac. 717 (1930), with
Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124, 237 Pac. 21 (1925) (Creditors whose claims are contingent, as for example the claim of an employee not yet wrongfully discharged under
decedent's contract to employ for life of employee, must nevertheless serve and file the
claim during the non-claim period as a prerequisite to recovery of damage suffered
after the period has run.).
The only exception to the statement in the text is that practice has it, and the court
would probably approve, that the non-intervention excecutor need not present the claim
to the judge for his endorsement, whether for the purpose of avoiding surcharge or
permitting the creditor to recover, despite WAsH. REV. CODE § 11.40.030 (1956), which
so requires. This result seems implicit in the holding of State ex rel. Jakobsen v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 583, 221 Pac. 608 (1923). See discussion note 144 infra. For
the pre-1917 law, see text accompanying note 31 supra. If, however, the logic of
the court's argument in First Security & Loan Co. v. Englehart, 107 Wash. 86, 181
Pac. 13 (1919) ("every executor" as used in the statutory sections governing ordinary
probate means to include non-intervention executors) is pushed to its extreme, there
is room in the statutory sections pertaining to creditors' claims to conclude that the
non-intervention executor must also submit the claim to the judge for endorsement.
See text accompanying note 45 supra, and for a recent case apparently picking up the
argument for a different purpose, see text accompanying note 120 infra.
81 See discussion in text accompanying notes 86-96 infra. In fact the regular
procedures for sales and management of property seem to be coming over toward
those for non-intervention proceedings. The 1955 legislature authorized the court to
order an ordinary executor or administrator to continue a decedent's business. WASH.
Rxv. CODE § 11.48.025, and the 1965 legislature authorized sales "by negotiation."
Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 57, 59, 66.
82 See discussion in text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
83 Compare In re Hooper's Estate, 117 Wash. 463, 201 Pac. 740 (1921), with In re
Dorey's Estate, 62 Wn. 2d 152, 381 P.2d 626 (1963). Curiously, the court, sua sponte,
raised the question whether the statutory allowance for family "applies to a non-intervention will... ." in It re Williamson's Estate, 38 Wn. 2d 259, 266, 229 P.2d 312, 316
(1951).
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whether finality is accomplished by the non-intervention executor who
does not choose to come back to the court with his final account and
take a final decree is still anybody's guess. 84
At the same time, however, the process of assimilating the nonintervention executorship back into the regular procedure has come
nearly to a halt," and the demarcation between the two types of proceedings has perhaps become more clear. Such developments as did
take place during this period were confined to two general fields: first,
the non-intervention executor's disposition of the decedent's property;
and second, the non-intervention executor's personal accountability and
amenability to court supervision and control. The development in this
second field has brought further refinement to the conceptual thesis that
the non-intervention executor normally has a jurisdictional immunity
from court control.
One would have thought that the 1917 legislation settled most of
the questions about the non-intervention executor's power to deal with
the decedent's property. Certainly by that legislation he could deal
with the property in almost any way. Some argued,"0 however, that even
the non-intervention executor had to observe that his job was to wind
up the decedent's affairs, not to be his own entrepreneur, and that his
actions must therefore be an appropriate incident to that process;
they could not be actions dictated only by those factors which might
lead a person who, as he handled his own affairs on a long-term and
continuing basis, might decide to buy, sell, or exchange because of
his premonitions of a change in the market or his sensibility to a good
investment. Yet, to concede such a limitation on the non-intervention
executor offended the general concept that the non-intervention executor was something special and, particularly, that if inquiry had to be
directed to the adequacy of the reasons for each sale or transfer, such
a limitation would thwart the underlying objective of the non-intervention executorship. In other words, to limit the non-intervention
executor to those transactions for which an ordinary executor would
be assured of court approval, such as a sale to raise cash for payment
of taxes or debts, would put him in no better position than an ordinary
84 See discussion in text accompanying notes 152-57 infra.
85 Or so it seemed until the decision of the court on September 9, 1965, in Gwimi
v.
Church of the Nazarene, 65 Wn. Dec. 2d 823, 405 P2d 602 (1965). In this case the
court appeared to take another major step in bringing the non-intervention executor
back into the fold. See discussion in text accompanying note 119 infra.
86 Foster, Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators c.t.a. Under NonIntervention Wills, 16 VAsH. L. Rav. 196, 198 (1941).
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executor with a power of sale specified in the decedent's will; and something more than that was intended.
The problem was compounded because the legislature had tinkered
with the non-intervention statute in this respect on two occasions,
once in 1897 and again in 1917, in varying terms specifically reciting a
power of sale." The question therefore arose whether the legislation
was a new grant of power not otherwise present or simply a reassurance
that, among the very broad powers of a non-intervention executor, he
certainly had the power now recited.
The broad question came to the appellate court in Hutchings v.
8 a particularly demanding
Fanshier,"
case, where a non-intervention
executor, to his apparent personal advantage, had exchanged property of the estate for certain other property of doubtful value. In
this action, brought by a taker under the will against both the executor
and the grantee, the court held89 the conveyance to be wholly ineffective.
The majority opinion rested the result upon the bald statement that
the executor had power to sell only for cash, not differentiating a
non-intervention executor from an ordinary one. The court added
that it saw nothing in the wording of this particular will to enlarge
that power.
Strangely, the court did not debate the meaning of the applicable
language of the non-intervention statute, even though it would have
been possible to sustain the decision by this resort. A strict constructionist, for example, would observe that the 1917 statute gave the
non-intervention executor power only to "mortgage, lease, sell or
convey"; 9" it said nothing about "exchange." Even this list of powers
was larger than it had been prior to 1917, when it included only "sell
and convey."'" A tolerant constructionist would not necessarily have
come to the same conclusion, for, it should be noted, the 1917 amendment also added the words "and in all other respects administer and
settle the estate without the intervention of the court."9 To sustain an
executor's exchange of property, then, the argument would be that the
1917 legislature, if not the earlier legislature, meant by its list of
"mortgage, lease, sell or convey" merely to be itemizing for illustrative
87 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 286; Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 667.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 28, 43 supra.
88 132 Wash. 5, 231 Pac. 14 (1924), appeal dismissed upon stipulation pending rehearing, 134 Wash. 704, 236 Pac. 119 (1925).
89 In view of the dismissal pending rehearing, the decision is of doubtful authority.
90 Vash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 667.
91 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 98, at 286.
92 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 667.

19661

NON-INTERVENTION EXECUTOR

purposes, and that the "in all other respects" language was the broad
general term under which "exchange" of property might also be
included. Even if this interpretation had been adopted, however, there
was still a substantial limitation in the fact that the non-intervention
executor was expected to "administer and settle the estate," nothing
more. Presumably, then, the non-intervention executor's handling
of property must at least be part of the ordinary administration
process.
These observations suggest that although an exchange may under
some circumstances be permitted to the non-intervention executor," the
result in this particular case can still be sustained, for in it the executor's exchange was not only costly to the beneficiary, it was also
personally beneficial to the executor, obviously not part of "administering and settling the estate."
Yet this interpretation leaves open the question whether a third
person dealing in good faith and for value with the non-intervention
executor should be bound to make inquiry. Hutchings, it will be
noted, held that the third person had to reconvey. Under the facts,
however, there is strong indication that the grantee knew or ought to
have known that the executor was personally gaining and the beneficiary suffering from the transaction.94 Even though the case did not,
therefore, answer the question, its language brought some advice of
caution to the lawyers. As one commentator put it, "[t] he safe rule to
follow would appear, therefore, to limit the power of such an executor
to sell to those sales which are necessary for ... [the purposes of

administration],""' i.e., to raise funds for paying debts and expenses
of administration and for paying succession taxes.
Apparently restive under the teaching, such as it was, of this case
and under the advice based on it, third-person purchasers, their lawyers, agents, and insurers finally were benefited by legislative change.
In 1955 the legislature added the sentence, "The other party to any
such transaction and his successors in interest shall be entitled to have
it conclusively presumed that such transaction is necessary for the
93 The 1965 legislative revision and re-enactment of the probate statutes added to
the non-intervention sections specific power for the executor to exchange property and
to "borrow money on the general credit of the estate" Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch.
145, at 72. Similar powers, to be exercised under supervision and order of the court,
were given to ordinary executors and to administrators. Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch.
145, at 56, 66.
94 132 Wash. at 7-8, 231 Pac. at 15-16.
95 Foster, supra note 86, at 198.
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administration of the estate." 98 Note the implication: The transaction
is to be actually necessary, presumably, in any argument between a
taker under the will and executor. Thus, while a third-person transferee
might get the property free of the beneficiary's claim, the executor could
be enjoined from making an unnecessary transfer or be held liable to
the beneficiary for damages resulting from an unnecessary transfer.
That the 1955 legislature was concerned primarily with mobility
of the property is shown in an additional change made by that legislature to the non-intervention statute. The need for the legislation arose
from the practice of non-intervention executors to close the estate
without taking a decree of final distribution. They could, of course,
after the decision of 1915"7 and the confirming legislation of 1917,11
effectively take such a decree, but nothing required them to do so, and
many did not. The lack of the decree, however, caused considerable
uncertainty in the marketability of real property, for despite the previous legislation declaring immediate devolution of title to the takers
under the will upon the death of the decedent,99 that devolution was
still subject to the "debts, family allowance, expenses of administration
and any other charges for which such real estate is liable under
existing laws." 0 With the entry of a decree approving a final account
and directing distribution the record of the probate proceeding usually
gave certainty that the real property was no longer subject to such
charges. One was not so sure with the non-intervention proceeding if
no final decree had been taken. Because of this uncertainty, undoubtedly compounded by the dilatoriness of many non-intervention executors, the legislature in 1955 added that "[i]f no application for a final
decree is filed, the executor shall, when the administration of the estate
has been completed, file a written declaration to that effect.... "'

In addition to the foregoing developments in the non-intervention
executor's capacity to deal with property of the decedent, the goingbusiness assets of a decedent presented peculiar problems for the
winding-up process."' At their heart lay the necessity to accommodate
90

Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 205, at 847, currently WAsH. REv. CODE: § 11.68.040

(1956).

97 Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915), note 38 supra.
958Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 666. See discussion in text accompanying
note 40 supra.
99
Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 197.
100 Wash. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 105, at 197.
103 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 205, at 845, currently WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.68.010

(1956).

102 Note that the text does not discuss the handling of a decedent's interest in a
partnership business. The chapter of the probate statutes pertaining to partnership
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two conflicting considerations. On the one hand the value of a going
business is, by definition, the very fact that the business is a continuing
affair, a value over and above that which would be produced by a
liquidation of the other business assets. On the other hand, since the
affairs of a decedent are to be wound up, not perpetuated, the going
business value, as such, must presumably be sold or transferred within
a reasonable time from death. Such a sale is usually difficult, requiring
substantial time to arrange and consummate; or, it might be appropriate to preserve the going business for distribution to a taker under
the will. During the interim, i.e., before sale or distribution, the executor must continue the business simply to keep up its value. He might,
for example, purchase new stock and equipment, employ new personnel, and the like. Can he do so?
Prior to 1955, at least if no specific power were given in the will to
do so, an ordinary executor or administrator had no such power, and
the court could not give it to him."0 3 In that year legislation was enacted
to allow the ordinary executor or administrator to continue a decedent's
business "[u]pon a showing of advantage to the estate," but only under
court order specifying in detail the limitations upon the power thus
granted 0 1
Apparently out of excess of caution the legislature wished to make
it clear that a non-intervention executor need not follow the procedure
prescribed by the 1955 act, thereby recognizing earlier cases. 5 in
which the court had stated that such an executor could continue the
decedent's business. The language of the statute, however, uses the
assets has apparently been applied by the court to non-intervention and to ordinary
proceedings alike. Case authority is meagre: See Niemeier v. Rosenbaum, 189 Wash.
1, 7, 63 P.2d 424, 426 (1936) and Brief for Respondent, p. 25, in that case for what
appears to be the court's assumption that these statutes apply to a non-intervention
proceeding. Here stated in very general terms, the current statutory sections acknowledge the dissolution of the partnership on death, allow the surviving partner to continue the business, and require him to file an inventory in the probate proceeding and
to account to the executor or administrator with respect to his winding up the former
partnership. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.64.002-.040 (1956).
103 State ex rel. Carlson v. Superior Court, 47 Wn. 2d 429, 287 P.2d 1012 (1955)
(applying prior law). The majority opinion in this case suggests that the administrator could have been authorized temporarily to conduct the business; one would think
that under the facts of the case the trial court's order could have been considered to
authorize no more than that. 47 Wn. 2d at 436, 287 P.2d at 1016 (Emphasis in
original). Limited authority, prior to the Carlsom decision, had been recognized in
In re Ennis' Estate, 96 Wash. 352, 165 Pac. 119 (1917). The two cases are discussed
in Gose & Hawley, Probate Legislation Enacted by the 1955 Session of the Washing-

ton Legislature, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 22, 23-24 (1956).
104 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 98, § 1, at 499, currently WAsH. RF v. CODE § 11A8.025
(1956).
' 5 New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wn. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953). See
also In re Belknap's Estate, 12 Wn. 2d 643, 123 P.2d 358 (1942); In re Elvigen's
Estate, 191 Wash. 614, 71 P.2d 672 (1937).
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fessors Gose and Hawley,"0 7 writing shortly after the adoption of the
statute, see in it the possible negative implication that the non-intervention executor could not, even if he wished, obtain an order from
the court specifying the powers and duties he might enjoy in continuing
the operation of a business.'
If, as seems the case, the non-intervention executorship deserves a
measure of praise for its facility in handling and disposing of the
property of the decedent, certainly it must be condemned for its confused and inadequate amenability to the court for review or control
of the executor's personal behavior. In such matters as the nonintervention executor's accountability for sub-standard management
and the propriety of fees taken by himself for his own services or for
those of his attorney, the procedure is highly unsatisfactory. In this
latter aspect the court, probably more than the legislature, is to blame,
in its invention and perpetuation of the doctrinal analysis which puts
the non-intervention executor normally "beyond the jurisdiction" of
the court.
The statute does make an attempt, though redundant and turbid, to
define the court's power, such as it is, over the non-intervention
executor. It provides that if the non-intervention executor "fails to
execute the trust faithfully and to take care and promote the interest
of all parties... [they may petition the court] ...and if, upon hearing
of the petition it appears that the trust in such will is not faithfully
discharged, and that the parties interested, or any of them, have been
or are about to be damaged by the doings of the executor, then, in the
discretion of the court, administration may be had and required as in
the administration of estates."' 109
It will be recalled that prior to the decision in Bayer v. Bayer"' in
1915 the court's conception that as a "trustee" the non-intervention
executor was normally "outside the jurisdiction" of the trial court was
closely related to its separation of the "probate court" from the "court
106 The full sentence is: "Provided, That if decedent left a nonintervention will or
a will specifically authorizing a personal representative to continue any business of
decedent, and his estate is solvent, or a will providing that the personal representative
liquidate any business of decedent, this section shall not apply." Wash. Sess. Laws
1955, ch. 98, § 1, at 499, currently WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.48.025 (1956).
107 Gose & Hawley, supra note 103, at 24.
108 See discussion in text accompanying notes 142-49 infra, concerning the nonintervention executor's capacity to "come back into court" for interim orders.
109 WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.68.030 (1956).
11083 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915). See discussion in text accompanying notes
73-75 supra.
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of equity." Thus, that the non-intervention executor should be outside
the reach of one court did not necessarily mean that he was outside
the reach of the other. Indeed, a few cases". expressly held the
executor to be controllable by the "court of equity," by-passing or
ignoring the remedy within the non-intervention statute itself. But,
with the decision in the Bayer case so clearly pointing out that there
was but one court-the superior court-and the concurrent decline of
the characterization of the executor as a trustee, the idea that the
non-intervention executor might be supervised "in equity" as a trustee
was apparently also discarded." 2
11 Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 Pac. 1025 (1913) ; In re Guye's Estate, 63
Wash. 167, 114 Pac. 1041 (1911) ; Smith v. Smith, 15 Wash. 239, 46 Pac. 249 (1896).
But cf. State ex rel. Cox v. Superior Court, 21 Wash. 575, 59 Pac. 483 (1899) ; Newport v. Newport, 5 Wash. 114, 31 Pac. 428 (1892).
112 It is probable that the decline of this idea was also aided by the fact that routine
administration of trusts in Washington has not been subjected to close or regular court
supervision.
Statutory provisions for trustees' accounting and supervision have appeared in two
successive forms. The first was the adoption in 1941 of the Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act, by the terms of which trustees under both testamentary and inter vivos
trusts were required to render initial, annual, and terminal accounts in the superior
court, including submission to the court for setting the trustee's fees. The settlor
could, however, relieve the trustee from compliance with the statutory requirements.
It is believed that during the effective period of this statute (repealed in 1951) most if
not all lawyer-drawn trusts did so relieve the trustee. The typical clause is seen in
In re Parks' Trust, 39 Wn. 2d 763, 770, 238 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1951). The repealing
legislation of 1951, WAsH. Rav. CODE §§ 30.30.010-.110 (1955), again treats trustees
under testamentary and inter vivos trusts alike but imposes much milder control upon
the trustee, requiring only that an annual accounting be made to the adult beneficiaries.
In addition it permits the trustee to make such an accounting to the court and permits
the beneficiaries to petition the court to order such an accounting (the court "may"
direct the accounting). The settlor can waive only the requirement of direct annual
accounting to the adult beneficiaries, not the beneficiaries' right to petition the court to
order the in-court accounting.
The court has also been inclined to tolerance in overseeing the actions of trustees.
Typical of the attitude is the statement in Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Jarvis,
58 Wn. 2d 627, 630, 364 P.2d 436, 439 (1961) : "where... discretion is conferred
upon a trustee, the exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an
abuse of such discretion." (Emphasis in original.) In this case the court refused to
review the propriety of the decision of a trustee under an inter vivos trust to pay certain expenses for care of a beneficiary out of principal, a power which in its discretion
it could exercise. The court relied upon Monroe v. Winn, 16 Wn. 2d 497, 133 P.2d 952
(1943), involving a testamentary trust giving the trustees considerable discretion,
where the supreme court, overriding the trial court's determination that the trustees
had mismanaged the property and should therefore be removed, held that they had
"fully and faithfully performed their duties...." The court said, "there is no showing
that any funds have been misappropriated or that appellants have at any time acted in
bad faith or with any dishonest motive. Although they have erred in some respects,
yet their errors are not such as to have justified the court in ordering their removal. .. ." The standard applied was stated as follows:

[Ilt is apparent that the testator desired the exercise of the discretion and sound
judgment of the experienced trustees in the management of the trust property
rather than the judgment of the court A beneficiary of a trust has the right to
appeal to the court and call in question actions of trustees which he may feel are
not in his best interests, and the court has power to intervene. But this jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly with reference to a trust of the kind we are now
considering. 16 Wn. 2d at 510, 133 P.2d at 957-58.
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Thus, in the period following the Bayer decision, in a series of cases
starting in 1922, the court approached the question whether the statutory transformation of the proceeding into an ordinary administration
was the only available relief as being a fresh and new problem, not
burdened by older decisions.
The first case" 3 on the point, apparently establishing the statutory
remedy as exclusive, was weak, both in the narrowness of its holding
and in its ambiguity. Upon a petition by a taker under the will, the
trial court had ordered a non-intervention executrix to post a bond
guaranteeing faithful performance, despite the decedent's waiver of a
bond, and also enjoined the executrix from permitting the removal of
any of the assets from the state. In reversing, the appellate court
merely held that the non-intervention executrix was in fact behaving
properly. The court went on, apparently by dictum, to say it was not
going to decide whether the court could do anything different from what
the statute provides, but then added that the trial court's "mistake in
making the order is emphasized by the fact that it only purports to
order the execution of a bond and to forbid the removal of the
property, and does not attempt to provide 'administration be had and
required as is now required in the administration of estates.' M14
The opinion does not distinguish between the particular form which
the statutory remedy might take and, on the other hand, whether
some remedy wholly outside the statutory transformation of the proceeding into an ordinary administration might exist. Later cases
did so.
One group of subsequent cases demonstrates quite clearly that there
are remedies available outside the non-intervention statute for persons
harmed by the executor's actions. The first in this category is the suit
by the creditor to establish his claim. The creditor is entitled to, and
must, follow the procedure prescribed by the regular probate statutes
in order to establish his claim if the executor denies it.1 Furthermore,
the non-intervention executor must himself follow the regular statutes in rejecting the claim. 1 6
Similarly, the person who contracts with or otherwise asserts a right
as an outsider arising from the executor's conduct of the administration
213 It re Passage's Estate, 122 Wash. 249, 210 Pac. 370 (1922).
114 Id. at 250, 210 Pac. at 371.
115 Archer Blower & Pipe Co. v. Archer, 33 Wn. 2d 317, 205 P.2d 595 (1949);

First Security & Loan Co. v. Englebart, 107 Wash. 86, 181 Pac. 13 (1919).
116 Archer Blower & Pipe Co. v. Archer, 33 Wn. 2d 317, 205 P.2d 595 (1949).
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must bring suit for relief, quite independent of the non-intervention
statute."'
The non-rejected creditor and the taker under the will, however,
have not so clearly been entitled to relief outside the non-intervention
statute's transformation remedy. The reason seems obvious, for the
transformation statute is expressly phrased as a remedy for that particular type of misconduct by the executor. Nevertheless, the court
has twice given such persons relief wholly outside the statute, both
times under very similar circumstances. In the first of these cases," 8
at the request of a non-intervention executor, a citation for construction
of the will had been issued. In response, a distributee not only met
the citation, he also asked for affirmative relief-for an order requiring
the executor to make prompt distribution. The trial court, impressed
by the passage of over three years from the date of death and the
commencement of the probate, ordered the executor to wind up within
sixty days and to report back to the court. Yet the court expressly
noted that the statutory basis for control was not established. The
order required settlement of an argument with the Inheritance Tax
Division and payment of the tax, collection of a promissory note
payable to the decedent, and, arguably, payment of certain legacies
for which at the moment there was insufficient cash on hand and for
which the only cash prospectively available was from collection of the
note.
The second of these cases"' is very recent: in September 1965
the court followed the earlier case under nearly identical facts and
with similar reasoning. In the recent case there had been mild delay
and apparently some dilatory tactics by the executor; yet there certainly was not a sufficient basis in fact for invoking the statutory
remedy. The trial court's order had been similarly mild, milder even
than the sixty-day wind-up ordered in the 1937 case. Here the court
simply directed the executor to distribute the residual estate to the
named devisee "as promptly as is reasonably possible."" 20
In affirming, the supreme court purported not to be interfering with
the non-intervention status of the executor, saying such an order still
allowed him to perform. The court did say, however, as did the court
117 Jones v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P.2d 915 (1935) ; it re Peabody's Estate,
169 Wash. 65, 13 P.2d 431 (1932) ; cf. Kennedy v. Burr, 101 Wash. 61, 171 Pac. 1022
(1918).
118 ht re Johnson's Estate, 192 Wash. 439, 73 P.2d 755 (1937).
111
0 Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wn. Dec. 2d 823, 405 P.2d 602 (1965).
Id.at 832, 405 P.2d at 608.
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in the 1937 opinion, that it was the executor's statutory duty to wind
up an estate expeditiously, citing the statute governing the regular
probate procedure.' 2'
Another broad group of cases concerns the varying types of relief
which the statutory transformation remedy affords. At first glance
one might be tempted to conclude that only one type was availablethe actual transformation of the proceeding into an ordinary one,
under the direct supervision of the court, for the statutory language
is specific:

...

administration may be had and required as is required

in the administration of estates.
.
The first variant may appear in reality to be no departure from the
statutory relief, or at most to be purely ancillary to the principal
relief. It is demonstrated in a 1926 case 12' in which the takers under
the will petitioned the court to assume control over the non-intervention
executor's actions because of threatened harm, thereby to transform
it into an ordinary administration. Incident to their application they
asked that the executor be temporarily restrained from selling certain
real property pending the hearing on the petition for transformation.
The supreme court reversed the trial court for sustaining a demurrer
to the petition, thus in effect holding that the temporary relief was
available.
The next variant was more drastic. In each of two cases" 2-4 the
court has indicated by dictum that, again as incident to the transformation into the ordinary administration, the misbehaving nonintervention executor was to be removed from office. The statements
are unsupported by argument or authority. The conclusion is perhaps
defensible, but it did deserve an articulated analysis. These dicta have
apparently been tolerated by subsequent practice and appellate decision. On the other hand, no subsequent case has been found in which
the proceeding was transformed into an ordinary administration.'
121

WASH. REV.

CODE

§ 11.48.010 (1917). This section furnishes another instance of

the regular statute's use of the words "every executor..." in the same context as in the
creditors' claims sections discussed earlier, notes 48-52 supra.
122 WASH. REv. CODE § 11.68.030 (1956).
123 In re Chillson's Estate, 138 Wash. 171, 244 Pac. 244 (1926).
24
1
1i re Johnson's Estate, 192 Wash. 439, 73 P.2d 755 (1937); In re Passage's
Estate, 122 Wash. 249, 210 Pac. 370 (1922).
125 In one case, In re Chillson's Estate, 138 Wash. 171, 244 Pac. 244 (1926), the
court did reverse the trial court for sustaining a demurrer to a petition asking that
the proceeding be transformed into an ordinary administration. The facts alleged
were extreme: petitioners were devisees of two-thirds interest in the property; the
executor was about to sell certain of the real property to his daughter (not a taker
under the will) for half its value; petitioners offered to pay all creditors' claims
themselves.
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Three appellate decisions 126 do exist, however, in which an executor
nominated in the will to serve in a non-intervention capacity was
subjected to drastic control by the court, such as removal, but in each
of these cases the executor had failed to qualify as non-intervention.
The third type of aberrational relief, though much less drastic than
removal of the executor, is more subtly based. The relief consists of
court scrutiny and action upon only one particular challenged phase
of the non-intervention executor's conduct. In one case, 2 the question was whether the court should scrutinize the executor's management in order to determine whether to order him to appeal an adverse
decision in a suit brought upon a rejected creditor's claim; in others 2 '
the question was whether the fees taken by the executor for himself
or his attorneys were to be reviewed and, if so, re-set by the court.
One of the factors which influenced the court in its hesitance to
order a transformation into the regular proceeding, while still affording
some milder form of relief, was contained in certain ambiguous language of the non-intervention statute itself. The portion of the statute
which describes the circumstances under which the court can order
the transformation into the ordinary administration, it will be recalled,
speaks of two types of misbehavior: one, a failure to take care, as a
measure of negligence; the other, actual bad faith by the executor." 9
In decisions starting with Holmgren's Estate. ° in 1937 the court
seems to have emphasized the bad faith aspect, not the negligence
aspect, thus suggesting that although a particular non-intervention
executor might be behaving badly, he was not behaving badly enough
to invoke the transformation statute. This difference is particularly
apparent in the Holmgren and Coates' cases discussed below.
The second factor influencing the court was the doctrinal analysis
previously discussed under which the non-intervention executor was
thought to be outside the jurisdiction of the court, to be brought
back into the jurisdiction only if the statutory grounds be established.
With this concept the court could easily take the position, as it did, that
it would not and could not scrutinize the actions of the non-intervention
12, In re Beard's Estate, 60 Wn. 2d 127, 372 P.2d 530 (1962); In re Clawson's
Estate, 3 Wn. 2d 509, 101 P.2d 968 (1940); In re Wolfe's Estate, 186 Wash. 216,
57 P.2d 1066 (1936).
'127State ex rel. Jakobsen v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 583, 221 Pac. 608 (1923).
128 See, e.g., In re Holmgren's Estate, 189 Wash. 94, 63 P.2d 504 (1937).
129 WASY. REv. CoDE § 11.68.030 (1955), Negligence: "... fails... to take care and
promote the interest of all parties..."; bad faith: ". . . fails to execute the trust faith-

fully.. ." and ". . . the trust in such will is not faithfully discharged .

130 189 Wash. 94, 63 P.2d 504 (1937).
231 In re Coates' Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 250, 347 P.2d 875 (1959).
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executor unless the court somehow regained jurisdiction over the
proceeding. On the other hand, by decision in the Bayer case 32
in 1915 the court had permitted the non-intervention executor to
bring himself voluntarily back into the fold of the court's jurisdiction.
Such metaphoric legerdemain was sure to cause surprising results,
and it did.
By the combination of these two factors the court "assumed jurisdiction" in several cases, to do particular narrow acts. Those cases
involving fees furnish the best illustration.
First, consider two cases which illustrate the influence of the definitional section of the transformation statute, i.e., what conduct
furnishes a basis for the court's assertion of control. In the first,
In re Holmgren's Estate,"' the takers under the will had objected to
the amount of fees which the non-intervention executor had allowed
to himself for his services. The court, while acknowledging the allowance to be liberal, said "[t] he question is not, in the first instance, the
reasonableness of the fee, as the question is presented when there is
an administration of an estate under the direction of the court, but
whether the executrix and the executor have faithfully discharged
their trust,"' 34 then found there was no "unfaithfulness." Then in
In re Coates' Estate,"5 ' a 1959 case, in much the same situation the
court said that an allowance of fees must be so bad as to constitute a
mulcting of the estate, as in a case of actual fraudulent behavior, to
justify the court's interposition.'36
Even this relative freedom of an executor to set his own fee, under
this definition of the statutory grounds for court participation, might
have been tolerable had it not been aggravated by certain consequences
which developed from the jurisdictional immunity with which the
court had surrounded the non-intervention executor. The awkwardness of this concept had furnished some puzzling problems. For
132 Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915), discussed, supra note 73.

133 189 Wash. 94, 63 P.2d 504 (1937).
"34 Id. at 96, 63 P.2d at 506.
135 55 Wn. 2d 250, 347 P.2d 875 (1959).
136 Id. at 260, 347 P.2d at 880: "There is no evidence that the executor was motivated by any desire to receive more money than it honestly felt it was entitled to receive, that it acted fraudulently, or that it was faithless to its trust in making this
charge for its services and in paying its attorneys the same amount. ...A mere honest
difference of opinion is not enough. Fraud is never presumed, but must be proved by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Here, there was no evidence of faithlessness
whatever, so there was not, and could not have been, a finding of fact of the kind
necessary to permit the probate court to assume jurisdiction. Calling the fees charged
'excessive' is not sufficient to vest jurisdiction where no intent to mulct the estate was
proved or found"
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example, could a non-intervention executor become a regular executor
for some purposes and not for others? Could he, for example, submit
his final account for court approval without at the same time submitting the setting of his fee for services? Or, could he submit some
interim matter, such as a question of construction of the will, to the
court's jurisdiction, get his answer, then withdraw into his "out-of-thejurisdiction" status again?
This picture of a now-you-see-it-now-you-don't executor did indeed
develop, at least with respect to those matters in which he would
normally be free of court control. Possibly the clearest showing of partial submission appears, again, in cases dealing with the allowance of
fees to the executor for his services or for payment to his attorneys.
The first two cases were fairly orthodox. In the first," 7 a 1924 case,
a non-intervention executor had filed his final account and asked for
approval. Then, upon appeal from an order approving the final account, the court in reviewing many assignments of error specifically
held that the attorneys' fees allowed by the trial court were proper
under the applicable statute, which prescribed a "reasonable" fee. In
a subsequent case"' a few years later an attorney petitioned the court
in the probate proceeding for an order directing a non-intervention executor to pay an appropriate fee for the legal work. The court balked,
saying it had no power to do so since the non-intervention executor was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The court distinguished the earlier
case on the ground that there the executor had himself applied to the
court for relief by filing his final account and asking for court approval.
Against the background of these two cases, which were consistent
with the earlier-developed limitations on jurisdictional power of the
court, came In re Holmgren's Estate39 in 1937 with a remarkable
refinement. In this case a non-intervention executor had filed his
final accounting and asked for court approval in the accepted manner,
showing payments of certain sums to himself as executor and to his
attorneys. The distributees objected to these as excessive. In this
situation the procedure of the 1924 case, the first in the series, clearly
called for the court, its "jurisdiction being invoked," to pass upon the
reasonableness of the fees. But, resting on completely different
grounds, the court refused to consider the reasonableness of the fee,
holding that the objecting distributees had first to establish that the
137 I re Brown's Estate, 129 Wash. 84, 224 Pac. 678 (1924).
138 In re Megrath's Estate, 142 Wash. 324, 253 Pac. 455, 256 Pac. 503 (1927).
13" 189 Wash. 94, 63 P,2d 504 (1937).
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executor had been "unfaithful to the trust" under the language of the
non-intervention statute before the court would intervene. The court's
statement on the point is clear: "While the allowance may be liberal,
it is not such an amount as to show that the executrix and the executor had not faithfully executed their trust, and it is only in such a case
that the superior court is authorized to take jurisdiction ...

M40

On the merits it is a little hard to accept the proposition that an
executor who submits a final account and asks for approval in order
to get the finality which the non-intervention procedure may not otherwise afford does not at the same time submit to the court's evaluation
all the actions which that accounting reflects. Yet the 1937 rule has
persisted. A particularly flagrant case appears as recently as 1959,
wherein the court refused to consider the correctness of41highly generous
fees absent a showing of "intent to mulct the estate.'
This last case also illustrates the transient character of partial
submission. In the argument over the amount of attorneys' and executor's fees, the objectors sought the court's scrutiny and setting of fees
on the ground that since the non-intervention executor had previously
submitted a certain controversy to the court in the probate cause it
had "invoked the jurisdiction" of the court and thus was in court for all
time thereafter. It was a fact that the executor had, previous to filing
its final account, submitted to the court's jurisdictional reach in order
effectively to argue and litigate with the Inheritance Tax Division of
the state as to the value of the estate for taxation purposes, following
a procedure afforded by the taxing statutes. The court held, however,
that submission to the power of the court could be both selective and
transient, that it was not an "abdication by the executor of his nonintervention powers under the will and his submission to the general
'
jurisdiction of the probate court."142
(Emphasis added.)
140 Id. at 98, 63 P.2d at 506. In fairness to the court in Holngren, it must be noted
that the court in the Brown case had approached its review of fees quite without discussion of whether it could review, simply assuming that the fees were to be allowed
in the discretion of the trial court and seeing no reason to disturb the allowance. The
court in Holngren similarly acted on an unexplored assumption. The difference in
assumptions, and in result, in these two cases can probably be traced directly to omissions in the argument of counsel in the respective cases. In Brozo, counsel were so
absorbed in whether the decedent's property was separate or community that no mention is made of the idea that the executor was not necessarily submitting the amount
of the fees when the final account was submitted; in Hongren the objectors assumed
the burden of proving "unfaithfulness to his trust" without suggesting that by filing
the final account and asking for approval the executor might have submitted the
amount of the fees to the court's determination.
141 11 re Coates' Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 250, 260, 347 P.2d 875, 880 (1959).
2
14 Id. at 256, 347 P.2d at 878.
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Used by a sophisticated non-intervention executor, the procedure
as thus developed allows him to dodge in and out of court with his
problems, asking for the finality of the court's adjudication when he
wants it and yet escaping the court's arm when it is convenient to
remain outside its reach.
The idea that the non-intervention executor may invoke the jurisdiction of the court, thus empowering the court to enter the kind of
order which it might have if the proceeding were an ordinary administration, may furnish an additional if different rationale for the result
of several of the cases here discussed. This approach, it is apparent,
is somewhat akin to finding a waiver of the immunity. For example, in
the discussion of available remedies, one case was noted in which the
court ordered a non-intervention executor to wind up in sixty days.143
This result could be explained as merely the furnishing of a milder
remedy than transformation of the proceeding into an ordinary administration, to meet circumstances not so bad as to warrant the invocation of the transformation remedy. It should be noted, however, in
that case the executor had himself come into court asking for some
specific relief (citing takers under the will in to litigate the meaning
of certain terms of the will); it was these very takers who counterclaimed asking for the sixty-day order. Could this order, then, have
been put under the heading of relief incident to the executor's submitting himself or his proceeding to the power of the court?'"
On the other hand, the opinion in a recent case of similar facts and
holding 1 5 is emphatic that the result does not rest upon the executor's
submission to the court. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that the
author of the opinion in this case also wrote the majority opinion in
In re Coates' Estate, where the selective and transient submission by
the executor was upheld. Yet, in the most recent case, that same
author insisted that "[w]e are not relying on waiver by appellant of
the non-intervention powers in this case".,14

rather, he said, the

1-3 In re Johnson's Estate, 192 Wash. 439, 73 P2d 755 (1937).
144 State ex rel. Jakobsen v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 583, 221 Pac. 608 (1923)
furnishes another example. There the court, in directing a trial court to order a nonintervention executor to appeal an adverse decision in an action upon a rejected
creditor's claim, pointed out that, with respect to this particular creditor's claim, the
executor had submitted the claim to the court in the probate proceeding, a step not
required of a non-intervention executor. The language, again, is of waiver: "In this
case it is apparent that the executor has voluntarily submitted to the court, as though
he were a general administrator, the question of the allowance of this claim and of
how and to what extent the litigation with reference thereto shall be carried on." 127
Wash. at 587, 221 Pac. at 609.
145 Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wn. Dec. 2d 823, 405 P.2d 602 (1965).
140

Id. at 832, 405 P.2d at 608.
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regular probate's statutory direction that every executor is "to settle
the estate in his hands as rapidly and as quickly as possible'" 47 is the
basis for sustaining the trial court's order that he "pay over the residual
estate to the Church as promptly as is reasonably possible. '4s
The practice of transient submission was reinforced by legislation
in 1965, with the addition to the non-intervention statute of the declaration that "[t] he obtaining of any interim order by the executor of
a non-intervention will shall not be deemed
to be a waiver of the non49
intervention powers of such executor.'1
WASH. REV. COD § 11.48.010 (1956).
148 66 Wn. Dec. 2d at 832, 405 P2d at 608. The author is cautious, however: he
goes on to say "[W]e rest our decision only on the fact that respondent, as a legatee
named in the will, may counterclaim in an action brought by the executor for an order
directing the distribution of its bequest (even when the executor has nonintervention
powers) in the same manner as if the legatee were the original plaintiff in such an
action." Does he mean to say that if the executor had not instituted the action, the
legatee could himself, without showing the statutory grounds of mismanagement under
the non-intervention statute, have initiated such an action to obtain the order for
prompt distribution?
149 Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 71, to be effective July 1, 1967. The 1965
general re-enactment and revision of probate statutes was drafted by a committee of
Washington State Bar Association. See note 52 supra for more detail. In Washington
State Bar Association, Commentary to Recommended Changes in Title 11 RCW,
§ 11.68.010, and again in Stewart & Steincipher, Probate Reform, in W~ashington, 39
WAsH. L. REv. 873, 891 (1964), it is stated that the statute's declaration with respect
to interim orders and waiver was added to "prevent the extension of this waiver rule.
... " The committee's concern would have been soundly based, had they chosen a case
like State ex rel. Jakobsen v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 583, 221 Pac. 608 (1923), or
even In re Coates' Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 250, 347 P.2d 875 (1959), to illustrate the narrow
scope of the waiver, where the court allowed the submission of an interim matter to the
court to be highly selective and transient, not to be a general waiver. The case in which
the committee professes to see broad waiver is only remotely in point. In the case, It re
Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn. 2d 509, 101 P2d 968 (1940), the supreme court sustained the
removal of an executor by the trial court, holding, however, that the executor, though
nominated to act in a non-intervention capacity, had never achieved that status since he
had never obtained an order of solvency, a sine qua non. It is possible, incidentally, that
until this decision the obtaining of such an order was not essential, in view of the holding of In re Hooper's Estate, 76 Wash. 72, 135 Pac. 813 (1913), to this effect. The
court in Clawson, however, clearly based its decision on the failure to obtain such an
order. There is some waiver language, but it seems incidental: "As his verified petition
shows, Clawson voluntarily surrendered whatever right he derived from the will to
act without the intervention of the court. He never became a nonintervention executor... ." 3 Wn. 2d at 516, 101 P.2d at 971. "[Slince we have found that Clawson did
not attempt to qualify as a nonintervention executor, but submitted the will for administration and his official acts to the jurisdiction and control of the court, the court was
not bound by the limitations of § 1462, relating to removal of nonintervention executors, for Clawson was no such an executor." Id. at 519, 101 P.2d at 972. Had the
committee seen the September 1965 decision in the Church of the Nazarene case
coming, their comment and the new statutory language might have been directed to
that case. There, certainly, the non-intervention executor had submitted an interim
matter to the court to determine the effectiveness of the residual bequest. The court,
no doubt by this time aware of the 1965 legislation, though by its terms (Wash. Sess.
Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 113) not to be effective until July 1, 1967, carefully stated that
it did not rely upon waiver.
The holding of the Clawson case, that an order of solvency is necessary, was reinforced in Coates' Estate by fairly clear implication and in In re Beard's Estate, 60
Wn. 2d 127, 372 P.2d 530 (1962), by explicit holding.
147
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It is possible that if the court or legislature at some stage early in
the development of the non-intervention executorship had provided for
finality to the executor's actions without requiring him to conform to
the regular probate procedure, the dissatisfactions and uncertainties
of the doctrinal analysis, with its transient and partial submission
concept and its too-strong immunity from needed court control, would
not have developed. As it was, however, since the general problem of
a lack of finality was not faced, the underlying difficulty persisted,
carrying with it a crowd of specific questions.
With the obvious and attractive route shown them by the decision
of the Bayer case... in 1915 and its confirming legislation in 1917 ,..
both of which permitted a final account and decree, those executors
and their lawyers have met the practical need for finality by making the
non-intervention executor much like an ordinary executor, filing final
accounts, publishing and mailing notices, holding formal court hearings
and generally submitting his actions to court scrutiny for approval.
Such a practice, of course, frustrates the purpose of the non-intervention executorship; yet, faced with the old case holding lack of finality,' G- coupled with the 1917 legislation which specifically permitted
the non-intervention executor to file a final account and take a final
decree,"5 3 the executors and their attorneys had little choice. If they
wanted to be sure of finality, they had to follow the regular route;
otherwise they were at best uncertain, at worst without finality.
The 1955 legislation which required a non-intervention executor, if
he did not take a final decree, to file a declaration of completion"5 4
arguably meant to substitute the declaration for a final decree as a
means for obtaining finality. Yet current commentators apparently
15o Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915).

See note 38 and text

accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
151Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, § 92, at 666. See text accompanying note 40
sup ra.
152 See the discussion in text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
153 Wash. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 156, at 666; currently WAsH. REv. CoDE § 11.68.010

(1956). A section added in the 1965 revision of the probate code seems to furnish even
stron.er impetus for taking a final decree. Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 79,
provides that when a non-intervention executor makes distribution to a minor, the
court may require either that it be paid over to a bank or savings and loan association
and withdrawn only on court order or that it be paid over to a general guardian for the
minor. The introductory clauses of the statute are in the alternative, covering distributions both by court order applicable to an ordinary administration and by a nonintervention executor acting under the terms of a will; yet the enacting portion of the
statute calls for court participation in both situations. Is the court's participation
mandatory, with the word, "may," indicating only the fact of alternative courses open
to the court? This section, it will be noted, will not be effective until July 1, 1967.
154 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 205, at 845; currently WAsH:. RFv. CoDE § 11.68.010

(1956).
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did not view the sentence in this light,'5 5 and there have been no
appellate decisions dealing with the question. As discussed earlier, the
purpose of the 1955 legislation was not to achieve finality in the res
judicata sense.
The problem is of course highly importait for many purposes-the
correctness of the allowance of claims of particular creditors, the
authoritative interpretation of the terms of a will, the correctness of
calculating shares of the takers, the appropriate allocation of principal and income, and many similar matters; all these are adjudicable
upon a final account and hearing, at least as to those persons who
have not previously been brought into the adjudicatory process at
some preliminary stage (an unusual situation). Even more troublesome is the uncertainty caused by decisions which hold that in
several situations the admitted will can be challenged even after the
expiration of the six-months will contest period. Typical of these is a
1945 case" holding that a subsequent will revoking the admitted
will can so be offered. Although the court has indicated that the entry
of a final decree of distribution will terminate the opportunity to
challenge the admitted will, it has not so indicated with respect to
the declaration of completion filed by the non-intervention executor
who chooses not to file a final account and take a final decree.'
IV. SOME JUDGMENTS AND A PROPOSAL

The underlying thesis of the non-intervention procedure is undoubtedly sound. Differing from the regular procedure, it recognizes that
the process of winding-up a decedent's affairs is mostly routine and
usually friendly; it is neither complex nor litigious. Given the proper
tools, an honest and modestly able person, with competent help, should
be able to carry out the process pretty much on his own. The basic
1.55 Gose & Hawley, supra note 103, at 30.
.6 In re Elliott's Estate, 22 Wn. 2d 334, 156 P.2d 427 (1945). For other cases see
In re Gherra's Estate, 44 Wn. 2d 277, 267 P.2d 91 (1954) and cases cited therein,
especially
44 Wn. 2d at 286, 267 P.2d at 96.
57
In In re Gherra's Estate, 44 Wn. 2d 277, 286, 267 P2d 91, 96 (1954), the court's
dictum was very specific: "Such circumstances [revocation of the admitted will by a
later will, revocation of the admitted will by the testator's subsequent marriage, etc.]
may be brought to the attention of the probate court and established as facts at any
time before the decree of distribution is actually entered." (Emphasis added.) In It
re Elliott's Estate, 22 Wn. 2d 334, 360, 156 P.2d 427, 440 (1945), the court, also in
dictum, used broader language: "[A] court of probate has inherent authority at any
time, while an estate is still open, to admit to probate a later will than that theretofore probated." (Emphasis added.) In neither of these cases had a non-intervention
executor made final distribution in his non-intervention capacity. Also, the statutory
provision for filing a declaration of completion had not yet been enacted at the time
either case was decided. Would the court consider "an estate still open" if the executor
today should file his declaration of completion?
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fallacy in the regular probate procedure is that it is designed primarily
to handle problem situations---dishonest and incompetent personal
representatives, scheming and dishonest relatives and creditors, will
forgers, poorly drafted wills and insolvent estates. For the great bulk
of situations-ordinary persons, straight-forward wills, and solvent
estates with ordinary assets-it provides only the most grudging relaxation of its elaborate precautions and formalities.
What is needed is a reversal in attitude. Rather than make all
persons and all probates go through the elaborate machinery in order
to be sure that all persons are protected, allow the mass of them
to be wound up in a simple manner, providing, to be sure, machinery
adequate to detect or prevent wrongdoing and adequate avenues by
which the adjudicatory process and strong arm of the court can be
invoked.'""
The advantages of such an approach are to be found in the elimination of much of the detail of reports and other filings with the court
and in the saving of time and effort of lawyers, parties, witnesses,
judges, and other court personnel engaged in court hearings when there
really is no argument or issue to be resolved. Out-of-pocket expenses
would incidentally be substantially reduced, for much of the publication of notices incident to the old procedures would be unnecessary,
lawyers' time would be reduced (a ten-minute hearing in probate can
take most of a morning, with the usual full calendar), and parties to
the proceeding would not need to take time from their work or to travel
substantial distances for needless court appearances.
To a limited degree the present scheme of Washington's nonintervention executorship affords these desirable results, without apparent harm." 9 In the very limited simplification in handling creditors'
15 The English probate procedure recognizes the distinction between "contentious"
and "non-contentious" proceedings, using a Probate Registry to permit non-adversary
establishment of wills and the grant of letters to the executor or, in the cases of intestacy, to an administrator. Contentious matters are removed to a court for disposition. Procedures are described in RUSSELL, PICKERING & ATKINSON, TRiSTRAm &
Cooni's PROBATE PRACTICE (22d ed. 1964). See also Simes & Basye, The Organization
of the ProbateCourt in America: II, 43 MiCia. L. REv. 113 (1944). A similar division
of functions is made in the court systems of several states. See Simes & Basye, The
Organization
of the ProbateCourt in America: I, 42 MICHs. L. REv. 425, 982-85 (1944).
0
15
A quantitative study of the actual operation of the non-intervention procedure in
practice has yet to be carried to completion. Certain preliminary work has been conducted under the author's general supervision by Mr. Robert G. Hutchins, now a
member of the Washington State Bar Association, when he was a law student. A
brief and partial summary of his work shows that of five months' probate filings in
King County (Seattle), roughly 67% were for decedents leaving wills, of which 90%
were of the non-intervention type. Of the estates with non-intervention wills, 81% of
those proceedings were actually conducted as non-intervention, the others failing for a
variety of reasons, such as the death or declination of the named executor. Both the

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 41 :33

claims which the present scheme affords (i.e., eliminating the necessity
for court approval of the claim unless the executor is himself the
creditor), the trip to the courthouse, the waiting in line with the brief
ex parte order, and the potential stumbling block if the step be omitted,
are all eliminated. No one seems to object that court approval is thus
omitted. Furthermore, in the sale or other handling of property the
extensive powers given to the non-intervention executor certainly
expedite the mobility of property, allowing effective sale through the
normal channels (i.e., sale of stock through regular dealers, of real
property through ordinary real estate brokers)16 with less complication, out-of-pocket expense, and elapsed time, and without the annoying problems of upset bids. Furthermore, these powers give more
latitude of judgment to the executor, probably for the good. In other
matters, too, as in the operation of a decendent's business, the additional latitude given the non-intervention executor is probably beneficial.
On the whole, however, it must be said that the non-intervention
executorship has failed in its underlying objective, for it is still
essentially tied to the regular machinery. This regular machinery is
geared for argument at nearly every stage; it makes all probates go
through its tortuous procedure, whether they are litigious or friendly.
As has been shown, the reasons for this failure were two: (a) the
failure of the original non-intervention statute to provide the basic
tools to accomplish the winding up, and (b) the failure of those who
worked with the system to supply the deficiencies while continuing to
testate estates and non-intervention wills appeared in even higher proportion in the
estates of high value. The order of solvency, necessary to transform the proceeding
thereafter into non-intervention, was usually not entered until a substantial time after
the probate was started, frequently several months later.
Preliminary examination of the data shows that in fact little harm seems to result
from the non-intervention character of the proceedings. One of the difficulties in
coming to this conclusion, however, is that the harm from the non-intervention procedure, if any there be, may be hidden from the court. This observation suggests the
need for further quantitative work, to look in other places for the good and bad of the
non-intervention executorship. Such sources as title companies, corporate executors
and trustees, and individual takers under non-intervention wills ought probably to be
pursued.
The author, like other attorneys he knows who have had substantial probate practice in this state, has the distinct impression that in general the non-intervention proceeding does not invite wrong-doing and error in serious degree. Its worst fault may
be a greater tolerance to dilatoriness than exists in the regular probate procedure. In
this respect the "probate checker" system, described note 179 infra, is very helpful
and desirable. It should be capable of working with the expanded form of the non-intervention executorship suggested in this article.
160 1965 legislation in Washington allowed the administrator and the ordinary executor, with specific court authorization, to sell "by negotiation." WAsH. REv. CODE §§
11.56.020, 11.56.050. See note 81 supra.
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serve the underlying purpose. Instead, their remedy was to bring the
non-intervention executor back into the fold of the regular probate
procedure. The solution could have been different; steps could have
been taken to give the non-intervention executor sufficient power and
conclusiveness to his action while maintaining his accountability.
They were not. Instead, in a piecemeal and narrowly-focused manner,
the non-intervention system has developed only as an aberration from
the regular procedure, with no resolution of its basic ambiguities, and,
to make matters worse, the invention of a conceptual analysis of little
utility and much harm.
The underlying ambiguities have been shown in detail: To what
extent, if at all, is the non-intervention executor governed by or capable
of using the regular probate machinery? To the extent that he is not,
what machinery does he use? No generalized solution or answer has
been offered; instead, remedies have been applied to various specific
subjects such as powers to sell property or procedures to follow when
the executor is himself a creditor of the estate. Let a new problem
arise, and there is no solution because there is no underlying basic
analysis.
Occasionally the legislature has been party to the process, being
moved to specify some new detail. For example, in 1897 it said that
non-intervention executors were to publish notice to creditors in the
manner provided for ordinary administrations; in 1917 it required a
non-intervention executor who was himself a creditor to submit his
claim to the judge for approval; in 1955 it gave power to the court to
authorize an ordinary executor or administrator to continue the business of a decedent under a court order, but it specifically excluded the
statute's application to non-intervention executors. 1 ' The legislative
history of the 1965 revisions indicates that the drafters believe that
the section of the regular probate statute which requires mailed notice
upon commencement and closing of proceedings applies to non-intervention executors, since, it is said, non-intervention executors are there
included in the definition of "personal representative." At the same
time the drafters assert that in other sections of the regular statutes
the non-intervention executor is not otherwise to be included in the
very same definition! The statute itself contains no such detail or
101 These three illustrations are discussed, respectively, supra notes 17, 44, 104-06.
The 1965 legislation also contains a specification of detail pertaining to non-intervention executors, in this instance with respect to distributions to minors. WAsHr. REv.
CODE § 11.76.095. See note 153 supra.
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differentiation. 6 2 The result is probably wise, i.e., requiring all
executors, non-intervention as well as ordinary, to mail the notices;
but the statute certainly is no help in reaching that conclusion. Again,
had there been some resolution of the underlying ambiguity, the
problem would not exist.
The one conceptual doctrine to come out of the non-intervention
executorship's history is highly unsatisfactory-that the non-intervention executor can enjoy a sort of immunity because he or his subject
matter is "beyond the jurisdiction" of the court. No reason appears
why he or his subject matter should be beyond the reach of the court.
The one case making the concept look entirely foolish is In re Coates'
Estate,6 in which the court by a vote of five-to-four allowed a
non-intervention executor (a bank) to allow itself fees arguably excessive and admittedly liberal, not because they were reasonable but
because the non-intervention executor's conduct of its affairs was
beyond the reach of the court and could be brought into court only
upon a showing of fraud or its equivalent-utter bad faith, in the
sense of mulcting the estate. That a court might decide that a fee is
reasonable though liberal is easy to see; but that a court should be
denied the power to review the matter except upon a showing of bad
faith is not easy to see. Matters in probate should be as much under
the power of a court of general jurisdiction as is any other matter; the
non-intervention executor need have no special jurisdictional immunity
in order to carry out his function. The reason he has latitude is to
avoid the cumbersomeness of court machinery in what is usually a
non-adversary proceeding; he does not enjoy his special status in order
to provide immunity from those who are hurt by his actions.
A further ramification of this jurisdictional idea is that the nonintervention executor can "come into the jurisdiction of the court"
when and if he chooses and for such specific purposes as he chooses.
Hence there has developed the anomalous spectacle of a non-intervention executor allowing himself a generous fee for services, claiming
and getting immunity from review because not submitted to the court,
and yet asking and getting court review of his final account and a final
decree which approves his actions during the conduct of the executorship and directs distribution, with its consequent finality and, as to
the executor, relief from possible liability.
There was no need to have gone along for one hundred years with
162

For further discussion, see note 52 supra.
Wn. 2d 250, 347 P.2d 875 (1959).
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this unsatisfactory state of affairs, for the problems were not that
difficult. What needed to be done, and what yet can be done, is to
rescue the basic philosophy of a non-intervention executorship. The
task now is to identify what the winding up of a decedent's affairs
must accomplish and then provide the means for doing it while still
keeping the perspective that the executor is usually not in an adversary
setting. At the same time the judicial machinery should be made
available to him or to his potential adversaries but only as it may be
needed; it should not be required of him or them.
The first step, in a sense a preliminary one, has roots of opposition
so deep that, although the need seems obvious, the point merits
argument. The proposal is simply to broaden the availability of the
non-intervention executorship. Now, of course, the procedure can be
utilized only if the decedent so specifies in his will and only for the
person he nominates as the executor. It should be available generally.
Indeed, there should be but one procedure, and it should be "nonintervention."

The advantages seem obvious. If the label, "non-intervention," be
removed and all personal representatives given the same powers, duties,
and amenability to the judicial process, much of the present difficulty
will be eliminated. Certainly the basic ambiguity of whether and to
what extent the non-intervention executor is tied to the regular
machinery would be eliminated, for henceforth all executors would be
governed alike. Furthermore, if the non-intervention executorship is a
good thing, as premised, many more persons will enjoy its advantages.
The very estates whose probate under the present machinery causes
the greatest howl from laymen-the simple estates with modest assets,
no arguments, and frequently no will-will thereby be given the
benefit of an efficient administration.
Yet, there will be objection. The two principal arguments in favor
of the present restrictions on availability are these: (a) The nonintervention proceeding gives such latitude to the executor that it can
be trusted only to one who is particularly well qualified, and, further,
the testator is the only person who can judge the qualification of
persons of this exceptional merit;"I and (b) since it is the testator's
',4 In a dictum in In re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn. 2d 509, 516, 101
P.2d 968, 971
(1940) the court expressed the philosophy in highly quotable form: "When a testator
makes a nonintervention will he, of course, strongly relies upon the personal qualifications of the executor he names. If he appoints A, and A refuses to serve, no substitution could be made by the court, as no one could say that he would have trusted B or
C to act without the intervention of the court." See also, Steincipher & Stewart,
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property being disposed of, he can do with it as he pleases, even to the
extent of specifying a particular method for its handling in probate."'
Neither argument is persuasive.
As to the first, the important point is that this proposal starts from
the premise that the proposed requirements of notice and accountability are sufficient to insure that any interested person will be adequately protected from the negligence or misbehavior of the executor.
Whether this result has been accomplished must be judged only after
the pertinent portion of this article be considered, infra, but for now
if the premise be accepted, the result is clear: If the system is good,
use it widely; do not make it available only in those instances where
the testator so designates for his named executor.
Furthermore, the testator is not the sole person capable of judging
the qualities of a person to act as a personal representative. While
this does not mean to say he ought not make such a nomination,
which in fact will be effective in all but a very few cases, certainly in
those instances in which he has not made a designation of persons,
there will be persons presently living who can make informed and
careful judgments too.
In addition, that the non-intervention executorship should be available to all does not mean that all estates will be administered exactly
alike. Certainly there will be occasions, perhaps unusual, in which it
will be necessary or appropriate to impose fairly strict controls upon
an executor, as where an estate is insolvent or where there is strong
intra-family tension and distrust. But, the important point is that the
court, when such situations are shown to exist, can meet the need. The
decedent ought not to be the only one to make such a determination.
The second argument, that the testator should be the only one who
can invoke the non-intervention proceeding since it is his property
which is being administered, should be recognized as a relic from days
of laissez faire dominance. True, the testator's wishes as to who is to
be the new beneficial owner of what was formerly his property are
usually respected; certain restrictions which he may put upon the
manner of use of that property, such as a restriction upon sale or an
immunity from the new owner's creditors are, with questionable wisProbate Reform in Washington, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 873, 891 (1965): "[Nlon-intervention status is achieved only by the express wish of the testator, who necessarily must
have faith in the judgment and prudence of his nominee... :'
165 Steincipher & Stewart, vtpra note 164, at 891, in reference to the non-intervention procedure, say: "[O]ne must not minimize the testator's right to dispose of his
assets,as he wishes." (Emphasis in original.)
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dom, tolerated61 But the concepts of property ownership which
underlie the testator's ability to choose the beneficiary and to restrict
his enjoyment of the property have no application to prescribing the
procedure for winding up his affairs. 6 The needs of this procedure
are diverse: it must serve creditors, distributees and heirs (who among
themselves may be of different needs and viewpoints), and taxing
authorities. In serving these persons the happenstance that a particular
decedent left a particular form of will is irrelevant. In fact, to let the
choice of the applicable procedure depend solely upon a judgment
made at some time in the past, possibly years ago, by a person now
dead, is an affront to the judgment and intelligence of those who
survive.
A variant of this property-right argument as a reason for giving the
testator the sole power to designate the procedure is that since it is his
136 Professor Richard R. Powell in his casebook, TRUSTS AND WILLS 188, n.54 (2d
ed. 1960), perceptively juxtaposes two different viewpoints, quoted here in edited form,
as follows:
See also, Spann v. Carson, 123 S.C. 371, 116 S.E. 427 (1923) ... saying: "The
property devised or donated belongs to the devisor or donor; it is his property, to
dispose of as he pleases; . . . the trust should be upheld, not because the law is
concerned to keep the donee from wasting it, though it may be as much concerned
about this as to protect the homestead of a debtor, but mainly because it is concerned in protecting the donor's right of property . . ." Compare Stimson, My
United States 76 (1931), where the author attributes Boston's commercial decline
to the Massachusetts' acceptance of the 'spendthrift trust.' "Immense wealth had
been accumulated in Boston in the first sixty years of the republic; instead of
trusting their sons and sending them out at their own risks with all their argosies
upon life's seas (as they themselves had done), they distrusted their ability . . .
and had them all trusteed. No new enterprise could be undertaken by them, for
... they had no capital to risk. Perforce they became coupon-cutters..."
Perhaps more modern than either of these viewpoints and certainly reflecting a
different societal concern is WAsHi. REv. CODE § 30.30.120, first enacted in 1951 and
amended in 1955:
Nothing in RCW 6.32.250 [which apparently makes all trusts in Washington in
effect spendthrift] shall forbid execution upon the income of any trust created by
a person other than the judgment debtor for debt arising through the furnishing
of the necessities of life to the beneficiary of such trust; or as to such income forbid the enforcement of any order of the superior court requiring the payment of
support for the children under the age of eighteen of any beneficiary; or forbid the
enforcement of any order of the superior court subjecting the vested remainder of
any such trust upon its expiration for the debts of the remainderman.
67
1 Rudkin, J., in answer to an argument that a statute enacted between the date of
execution of a will and the date of death could not effect a change with respect to the
procedure for handling creditors' claims as to that decedent's estate, said:
In the first place, the provision for notice to creditors and barring all claims not
presented within the year, relates to a mere matter of procedure, and is not
obnoxious to any provision of the constitution of the United States or of this state,
whether the provision be made applicable to estates already in process of administration or to estates to be administered upon in the future. In the second place,
the act of 1897 took effect long before the death of the testator, and as to his
estate the act does not divest or interfere with vested rights. The right to make a
testamentary disposition of property is neither a natural nor a constitutional right.
Such right is derived from and rests in positive law.
Strand v. Stewart, 51 Wash. 685, 687, 99 Pac. 1027, 1028 (1909).
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property he is giving away he may be as loose with its handling as he
wishes-that since the takers are getting gifts anyway they should
not be able to complain if the specified process does not include the
protection incident to normal probate.
The absurdity of the argument must be apparent. The first answer
is that the probate procedure is and ought to be designed so that it is not
loose. If it is loose, it should be changed so that it is not. The second
answer is perhaps more profound if not more effective. To allow a
decedent to be loose with his property after his death by choice of a
procedure which will not protect the rightful takers calls for a sanctity
to property rights which serves no societal purpose. Perhaps the
erection of a grand monument to the decedent's memory, while wasteful, is socially tolerable;16 but for funds or other property to be
diverted or wasted by a loose probate procedure, without even a
monument to show for it, is not.
The idea that since we are giving away something which was solely
the decedent's he may specify any disposition he wishes has of course
been subjected to many successful, if only partial, attacks: One has
only to consider the allowances to the surviving spouse and children,
the restrictions upon gifts to charity or churches, even the rule against
perpetuities, to realize that it is not wholly true that the decedent can
do with his property as he wishes.
These considerations seem conclusively to indicate that the scheme
should basically be uniform, with only such variations as are required
by the peculiar characteristics of the persons or of the property involved in a particular case. No variation should depend upon whether
the decedent left a particular kind of a will.
A quite different argument does have some appeal. Some would
defend the testator's choice of the named executor on the ground that
by his designation of a particular person he avoids an argument among
his survivors as to who shall be the personal representative. Perhaps
this is so. The conclusion, however, seems better in this form: In the
absence of any reason developed in the particular case to the contrary,
the person designated by the decedent ought to serve. If argument
should develop, the decedent's wishes should probably be given some
weight, since a decision based in part upon such consideration may be
better accepted. But the argument should not be carried any further.
If, then, the non-intervention procedure can become the standard
168 See Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347 (1883).
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and the only probate procedure, a real bonus will come with the change.
Not only will the advantages of the non-intervention executorship be
more widely enjoyed, but at the same time most of the current difficulties with the non-intervention executorship will have been avoided,
since, as has been shown, most of these result from the ambiguity
inherent in a dual system-a regular procedure and a non-intervention
procedure.
Even if it were feasible to remedy each difficulty which the earlier
parts of this article discuss, by specific legislation which carefully
defined the rights, duties, powers and liabilities of each of the two
types of executors, what is to be gained? only the doubtful value of
reserving the use of the non-intervention executorship to the privileged
ones whose decedent happened to leave a will and who are fortunate
enough to find the named executor still alive and capable and willing
to serve.
Much greater reward, therefore, seems to lie in the other direction:
concentrate on the non-intervention executorship, freed from the presence of its ungainly sibling. It will then be considerably easier to
adapt the old non-intervention procedure to its underlying purpose-the accomplishment of the winding-up process in a non-adversary
setting. Can an essentially non-adversary, non-court administration
scheme be formulated?
First, see how far an honest, moderately careful and competent, and
reasonably diligent executor and his lawyer, similarly qualified, could
themselves go in the ordinary, non-adversary winding-up process without some external help:
In the identification of and establishment of control over the assets
formerly owned by the decedent, the usual necessity will be to persuade others who have information or control to recognize the executor, giving him the information or relinquishing the control to him.
In its simplest form, the question will be: who is the true executor? If he be nominated by the will, presumably the executor could
carry the will around with him and identify himself as the person
there named. Realistically of course some show of officialdom will be
required; the point is, however, that it need not be the original or
certified copy of letters or other document issued by the clerk of the
court only after a court hearing and after the judge has signed his
name to an order appointing the executor to office and after the executor has executed and filed an oath that he will perform the office. As
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far as persuading these third persons of the identity and genuineness of
the executor's official capacity is concerned, any official document
should be sufficient. For example, an official in the county government
(call him the Registrar of Executors) 16 could issue certificates of office
upon there being filed with him the death certificate of decedent and a
certification of the same facts which now tell the judge that a certain
person is to be appointed the personal representative.1 0
In determining the decedent's liabilities and making provision for
their payment, in almost every probate proceeding the executor would
know or could find out enough about the decedent's affairs to identify
his creditors and, furthermore, will be quite willing to pay them.
Indeed, laymen in this situation seem sometimes to lawyers to be overanxious to get the debts paid. Most estates are solvent, and most
estates have no contests with creditors. This function of the execu169 This official will be recognized as somewhat similar to England's Probate Registrar and to similar officials in the procedures of some states. For a brief description
of these see Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: I,
42 Micni. L. REv. 965, 974-77, 982-85 (1944). A complete description of the English
system

is given in

RUssELL, PICKERING & ATKINSON, TRISTRAM AND COOTE'S PROBATE

PRACTICE (22d ed. 1964).
170 Since it is proposed to attach finality to those phases of the procedure with
which the Registrar may be involved, i.e., establishing the will, if any, and issuing
letters to the executor, there will be a temptation to give this officer extensive judicial
powers and procedures with which to work, even to the point of citing interested
persons before him, taking testimony, making decisions on the efficacy of a document
purporting to be the decedent's will, and the like. This result should be avoided, or at
least minimized, for it tends to introduce a two-tier adjudicatory system with all its
inefficiencies and inadequacies. See Simes & Basye, The Organizatimo of the Probate
Court in America: I, 42 MICH. L. REv., 965, 988-90 (1944). The proposal here is not
to establish the Registrar as a judicial officer in this sense; rather, his work is to be
primarily ministerial and largely passive. Conceivably he is to determine only that
there has been filed with him an application in proper form, accompanied by a death
certificate or acceptable substitute, a document entitled or described as the decedent's
will if any, and a paper, proper in form, labelled "Affidavit Showing Qualification."
Such a procedure should furnish the desired mobility of property with reasonable
assurance of proper distribution or devolution. Its primary reliance will be upon provisions for adequate notice to interested persons and consequent finality upon failure to
make timely objection by citation into the court of general jurisdiction-in Washington,
the superior court.
The English system of notice seems particularly good in this respect. First, it
allows an interested person to file with the Registrar a caveat, good for six months,
insuring that he be notified if application for letters be made during that time by anyone other than himself. Further, one week must elapse after application before the
grant of letters (two weeks upon intestacy). During that time a search is made by
the Registrar for any caveats filed (up to 10 a.m. of the day of the grant of letters)
and for any other proceedings which might have been instituted with respect to the
same decedent. Upon finding such a caveat, the Registrar stops his process, and the
applicant for letters issues a "warning" to the caveator to state his position. If the
persons establish their contrariety, they then resort to the court for pursuit of their
"contentious" proceeding. These procedures are described in detail in RussELL, PIcKERING & ATKINSON, TsusTmp
AND CooTE's PROBATE PRACTICE 19-23, 511-19 (22d ed.

1964).
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tor should be the easiest to perform without outside help from the
court or, for that matter, from any officialdom.
Likewise in the determination and payment of taxes incident to
death, the executor needs little help other than professional unless he
disagrees with the taxing authorities. If he does, he has available to
him under the taxing schemes adequate resort to machinery for adjudication. He needs no court participation as far as the winding-up
process is concerned.
Again, in the transition of control over assets formerly owned by
the decedent to those who are or will be the new owners, the executor
needs no court help; all he needs to do is to deliver that control. With
some types of assets, as corporate stock or an automobile, a third
person transfer agent or corporate secretary or a government official
title certifier will need some show of the executor's identity and authority. Here, too, the hypothetical certificate of the Registrar of
Executors should be sufficient.
Proper management of assets during the winding-up process will
also require some persuasion of third persons of the executor's identity
and authority. But, as with the identification and control of assets,
their management (including disposition as upon sale) need not involve the court. Again, the hypothetical Registrar of Executors'
certificate of office could be established as sufficient for this purpose.
The accomplishment of finality to the executors' actions should
pose no real problem. For some reason early in the history of the
non-intervention executorship there arose the misconception that finality was the sole province of the judicial machinery. There is no
magic in the mechanics of the judicial process. All it takes to accomplish finality to the actions, the status, or the rights of persons is to
declare that finality, and judges are not the only declarers. For
example, marriage is vulnerable only to death and divorce and to
vitiation for fraud or its equivalent. Closer to the problem at hand,
finality attaches to the actions of all the people in their dealings with
one another, in at least an indirect way, by the operation of the general
statutes of limitation, quite without court participation. Even closer,
finality attaches under the sudden-death statutes, which create wholly
new rights containing a built-in time limit; these are vulnerable only
if attacked within a specified time (usually very short-a thirty-day
claim period, for example).
In this fashion, the non-adversary winding-up process could give
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finality to the executor's actions simply by the passage of limited
periods of time, say ten to sixty days depending on what it is he is
about to do or has done, without objection having been properly
taken to the action or to the proposal that the action be taken.
So far the executor has been posed as a sort of superman-always
honest, careful, competent and diligent. His lawyer, too, has been
assumed to be the same. Can the winding-up process recognize human
frailties and still be kept essentially non-adversary, not involved with
court procedures? In other words, can pressures be incorporated into
the new procedure to keep a not-seriously-deficient executor on the
straight and narrow path?
The present regular procedure has several such external pressures,
most of them involving direct participation in courtroom proceedings.
For example, the lawyer and his client who appear before the judge
upon an ex parte hearing of a final account are under some compulsion
to be truthful. Similarly, the lawyer who gets a notice from the court's
clerk that his file in a particular probate has been neglected will, from
pride if nothing else, move the matter along.'A new procedure, conducted essentially outside the courthouse,
ought to be capable of incorporating similar devices. For example, at
the commencement of a decedent's estate administration the executor
will file an application with the Registrar of Executors. This ought to
be in the form of an affidavit upon which is spelled out the penalty for
perjury. The presence of a similar statement on one's federal income
tax return is probably of some value." 2 His lawyer, too, ought to
endorse the application, certifying that, on due inquiry and to the best
of his knowledge and belief, the statements made by the applicant are
accurate and complete. Similarly, as later material develops, the executor will be required to give fairly detailed and frequent notice to all
persons interested in the estate. This requirement should also be
conducive of honesty, care, and diligence.
Even though this executor is one with whom no one finds serious
fault and who therefore can operate fairly independent of the court,
he may find occasional use for the strong arm or the adjudicatory
capacity of the court. Opportunity should therefore be provided where171 See Note, Court Supervisian of the Administration of Estates and Guardianships,
34 WAsH. L. RFv. 263 (1959) and Steincipher & Stewart, Probate Reform in Washingto=, 39 WAsHi. L. Rxv. 873, 891-93 (1965), for a detailed description of an effective
"probate checker" system initiated and operated by the Superior Court for King

County (Seattle), Washington.
172 Occasional enforcement of this or related sanctions has helped.
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by he can invoke the court's process if he wishes. Here nothing much
different from the present regular procedure seems to be needed.
On the other hand, if the new procedure is to be substantially
removed from the court, major change will be needed in order to protect those interested in the estate from the executor who does not
perform properly.
The primary concern here is with adequate notice, for in order to be
acceptable the system must place persons in a position to invoke the
process of the court when the need arises. And to be in such position
takes knowledge of what is going on in the winding-up process.
The persons to be included in the notice, the time at which notice is
required, and the content of notice will vary from one estate to another
and with the aspect of the process under scrutiny. Broadly speaking,
the general standard should be that any person who can be harmed by
the actions of the executor should be informed of sufficient facts to
recognize with ordinary perspicacity any situation which calls for
his participation in sufficient time to take effective action.
Without detailing all the instances, a few illustrations will help:
a. Personsto be notified. Here, for example, consider the commencement of the probate proceeding. The person to serve as executor may
be one nominated by a will, or in the case of intestacy or unavailability
of such nominee, a person designated by statute. Upon such person's
wishing to act as executor he should file his application for letters,
together with the appropriate supporting documents and affidavit of
factual detail, with the Registrar of Executors and receive his letters.
Persons to be notified should include: the intestate takers, whether or
not there is a will; those named to take under the will, if any; and the
executor named in the will if the person assuming to act is someone
else, such as the surviving spouse asserting the statutory right to administer upon community property.
b. Timing of the notice. The general standard is, as stated, "in
sufficient time to take effective action." To this must probably be
added a modification, "considering, too, the need for the executor,
himself, to act promptly in some situations." For example, a notice
pertaining to the executor's sale of Blackacre should precede the sale
by several days, for obvious reasons-the uniqueness of land, the
substantial value usually involved, and the closeness with which many
persons are attached to this type of property. On the other hand, a
notice pertaining to the commencement of probate proceedings argu-

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 41 :33

ably could follow the commencement-soon, of course, but nevertheless
after the event. Here the need for effective action soon after death, the
mild character and rare instances of harm, and the amenability to
effective remedy even when after the fact might justify postponing
the notice." 3
c. Content of the notice. To the general standard, "of sufficient facts
to recognize with ordinary perspicacity any situation which calls for
his participation.. .," should be added two refinements: that not all
pertinent detail is required, only enough to put one on inquiry; and
that there must be specified the period of time within which he must
act to avoid the consequences of inaction and that finality will attach
if he does not act. The period of time so specified will vary with the
point involved. Of the commencement of proceedings and the propriety of the executor's having commenced them, the period should be
short, possibly ten days to two weeks; of the validity of a particular
will or of the fact of no will, fairly long, possibly six months or so; and
of the accounting and precise distribution contemplated and intended
by the executor, fairly short, say thirty days.
The consequences for failure to give notice should be shaped by two
general considerations: one, the sufficiency of those consequences to
act as a threat, to persuade the executor to give the notice in the first
place; and, two, the appropriateness of the benefits and burdens which
those consequences accomplish when they are incurred.
As to the first, there is no question but that as the severity of the
consequences increases, the likelihood of the executor's giving the
notice to avoid those consequences also increases. Certainly the
penalties for failure under the present scheme to publish the notice to
creditors are so severe that it is the rare executor who does not
publish. Here the lack of finality is persuasive. With respect to land,
at least 74 not even the six-year exoneration statute will help, since
it applies only if, within the six years from death, no letters have been
issued to the executor or administrator. Furthermore, the attorney is
impelled to remember the notice simply to avoid the embarrassment of
explaining to his client that now the estate must be held open another
six months, to let the period for notice to creditors run its course.
In addition to framing the consequences of failure to give notice as a
13 Compare the notice provided in the English procedure, supra note 158.
The scope of the exoneration statute was broadened by legislation in 1965 to
include all property. Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 113.
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threat to insure the giving of notice in the first place, those consequences should also be designed to help the person for whom the notice
was intended, to remedy the harm done by the failure. As to him,
however, harm may or may not have resulted, and the consequence
should be designed to remedy the harm, nothing more. This means that
instead of characterizing any particular requirement of notice as
"jurisdictional," in the sense that the giving of notice is an absolute
prerequisite to the validity of that part of the procedure to which the
notice pertains, the person not notified should be able to assert the
failure only when in fact he was unaware of the facts which the notice
would have furnished him and then only to remedy harm which he has
in fact suffered from the failure.
Whether this limitation upon the consequences will take away their
effectiveness as a threat, to insure the giving of notice, is perhaps
debatable. Certainly the drastic absoluteness of the present "jurisdictional" character of many notice requirements is effective; will
executors and their attorneys be equally impressed by a consequence
which falls short of that? It seems they would, for the fear of upset
from an unreached interested person will still be strong.
Will the title insurers in real property transactions be content with a
proceeding in which the required notice was not given but the executor
endeavors to persuade them that all interested persons knew the facts
from other sources or that no person was harmed by the failure to give
notice? Limited experience with a rule of similar character under the
present probate system suggests they would.1' Taking the cue from
the Mullane case,7 6 both the court and the legislature have required,
for the last ten years, a mailed notice to all interested persons of the
commencement of probate proceedings and, for those in which a final
17
decree is taken, of the intended terminationY.
Nowhere is it said
that the notice is "jurisdictional," and no Washington case so holds.
The underlying constitutional doctrine, like the consequence here pro175 They might exact a higher premium, as for years they did when passage of
title was accomplished by community property survivorship agreements under WASH.
REv. CODE § 26.16.120. The justification for the higher premium here presumably

rested in uncertainties incident to use of these agreements. See generally, Buckley,
Vic Cmnmunity Property Agreement Statute, 25 WASH. L. REv. 165 (1950) ; Oswald,
The Legal Efficacy of Attempted Methods of Avoiding Probate,5 WASH. L. Rxv. 1, 4-5

(1930)
7 0 ; Note, Community Property, 37 WASH. L. RFv. 120 (1961).
1 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950).
177 Wash. R. P., Prac. & Proc. § 98.04W; WASH. REv. CODE § 11.76.040 (1955). (A

portion of the statute previously contained in WASH. REv. CoDE § 11.76.040 was relocated by the 1965 legislature, creating a new section, § 1128237, effective July 1,
1967.) See Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 35.
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posed, would furnish relief only for the person harmed by lack of
notice, making the proceeding vulnerable only to him." 8 Yet the
fear that this consequence might arise has not led title companies to
refuse insurance. Indeed, it is believed that no real scrutiny is made
of probate files or other assurance taken to make sure that all inter179
ested persons were mailed the notice.

To be sure, there is a certain convenience to "jurisdictional" notice
requirements, at least those of the usual sort where notice is to be
published or posted, as distinguished from mailed. One does not need
to be concerned with matters of degree (was the unnotified person
actually harmed by the failure?) nor to any great extent with problems
of proof (was notice actually mailed to the complaining person?).
Instead, the simple routine of publishing a notice, clipping the notice
from the published newspaper, and incorporating it in an affidavit of
the publisher will establish all that needs to be known-the notice was
given as the statute requires. If the publication was not made, it
matters not that all creditors were actually paid or that all interested
persons actually knew that the final hearing was to be held on a certain
day at the county courthouse. Surely the probate system need not be
devised under the maxim that simple minds need simple rules; it can
stand the sophistication of a notice philosophy which requires both
the individuality of mailed notices and the rationality of actual harm
for vulnerability. 1 0
Of all phases of the procedure which require notice, that involving
creditors will probably be of most concern. Can their claims be handled
fairly without requiring a jurisdictional notice? Certainly in the
day-to-day administration of estates the minutiae of creditors' claims,
such as their proper execution, serving and filing, and the drastic
consequences of failure to publish the largely-unread formal notice to
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
In Note, Court Supervision of the Administration of Estates and Guardianships,
34 WASH. L. REv. 263, 267, 270-71 (1959), the author, who was the first "probate
checker" and thus helpful in getting the system started, notes that in 5.2% of the
estates checked for which the notice requirement was applicable there had been a
failure to mail notice to the persons statutorily prescribed. Most of these failures
apparently occurred in cases involving disposition by will, the attorney not having
read the statute carefully to perceive that notice is to be given not only to the takers
under the will but also to those who would take in the absence of a will. Except in
this particular, nothing in his note indicates, however, that any attempt is made to be
sure that the persons listed in the affidavit, as to whom notice was mailed, constituted
all the persons entitled to notice. Such assurance, of course, could not come easily.
180 For an interesting case in which the court relies on the "jurisdictional" characterization of a notice requirement but at the same time points to persons harmed by
lack of notice, see In re Peterson's Estate, 12 Wn. 2d 696, 123 P.2d 733 (1942).
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creditors or to follow some other essential step of the procedure, are
highly wasteful of time, money and effort and incur needless penalties
for carelessness or ignorance.
The obvious alternative is a mailed-notice system, carefully designed
to get notice to those who may need it and at the same time not nearly
so harsh in its penalties for imperfection. Further, the executor ought
to be able to pay creditors without the filing of claims, for in the ordinary case, unlike bankruptcy, the creditors will not be fighting to get
an inadequate share of limited assets. Here there are sufficient funds
and no contest of the validity of the obligation. The concern is to see
that any person who thinks he has a claim has an opportunity to assert
it. To protect that person the executor should be required to notify
all those who, he has reason to know, conceive their position to be that
of creditor but who are not within his intention to pay. The notice
should simply be of the fact of death and invite submission of claims
to the executor.
Finality should attach, as it does now, within a fairly short time, say
four months, measured from the time of issuance of the certificate of
the Registrar of Executors. To persuade the executor to notify persons who he has reason to know conceive that they have claims, those
persons ought to be protected by a considerably longer period, say six
years from the date of death, in which to assert their claims. They
should show, of course, that they were not notified and that they
suffered because not notified. Also, the remedies ought to be wider
than merely to make the property respond. The executor should be
personally responsible; and possibly the transferees, to the extent of
value received, should also.
A purpose akin to that which underlies the notice requirements is
served by having some general notoriety to the winding up of every
decedent's affairs. Aside from the dubious value in satisfying public
curiosity, the openness of certain features of the process does seem
properly useful. For example, the terms of a decedent's will ought to
be generally available in order that persons prospectively interested
may peruse the matter with comparative anonymity, to allow informed
judgments on whether the information thus furnished and possible
other information in the hands of the peruser justify pursuit of some
claim or position or other. Probably to be included in this category,
besides the will itself, are a list of assets and the known creditors
certified to the best of the executor's knowledge. The present system
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of accounting for the ownership of real property relies in part upon
the public record of the winding-up process; short of an overhaul of
that system there should continue to be the public record of the determination of ownership, in the case of the taking by will through
that
document, and in the case of intestacy by the executor's determination
of the takers.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing proposal is obviously rough, intentionally so. It is
meant to emphasize just three points: a) that a good procedure for
probate should be available for the estates of all decedents, not just
those decedents who leave a particular form of will; b) that a good
procedure for probate should recognize and utilize the fact that the
winding-up process is mostly routine and usually friendly; and c) that
a "non-intervention" system furnishing adequate notice, supplemented
by a few incidental pressures, can be relied upon to insure honest and
competent administration. Detail has been furnished for illustration
only, without thought that its precise form be eventually employed;
undoubtedly much of it should not.
The proposal therefore deals with the non-contentious aspects of
probate administration, finding little fault with, indeed not carefully
scrutinizing, the present procedures for handling contentious matters.
Spurring the inquiry and the formulation of the proposal was the
realization that the greatest cause for public complaint about probate
and for the ill-advised use of schemes to "avoid probate"'8 1 comes
from the inadequacy of our present system to handle non-contentious
matters.
The Washington non-intervention proceeding has been hidden in its
geographic isolation and in the self-content of the lawyers who use it
for these many years. Inspected now for both its good and its bad, it
shows its frustrations and inadequacies as deriving not so much from
the removed-from-the-court aspect but from its very closeness to an
antiquated and misdirected regular probate system, which is geared
for carelessness, dishonesty and litigation and encrusted with a pro181 Methods for effecting devolution of property other than by testate or intestate
succession are numerous and frequently employed. They include inter vivos gifts (in
trust or direct), insurance contracts, joint tenancies or other arrangements for survivorship, Totten trusts, and others of less merit such as exchanged but undelivered
deeds. The use of these methods is unquestionably appropriate in particular instances,
quite apart from "avoiding probate." To the extent, however, that the decision to do
so is impelled by unnecessarily high costs of probate the probate system has performed
a disservice.
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fusion of procedural detail. Freed of this, by making all non-contentious probate administration essentially "non-intervention", the administration of decedents' estates could and ought to be re-built,
adequately to perform its important task. Hopefully, in the hands of
craftsmen who will take these three major points for their working
base in fashioning the detail, the non-intervention procedure can be
developed into a practical, efficient, and integrated system, beneficial
to all societal interests at stake in the winding-up process.

